Dynamic Processes in Network Goods:  Modeling, Analysis and Applications by Paothong, Arnut
University of South Florida
Scholar Commons
Graduate Theses and Dissertations Graduate School
January 2013
Dynamic Processes in Network Goods: Modeling,
Analysis and Applications
Arnut Paothong
University of South Florida, arnut_tu@hotmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd
Part of the Applied Mathematics Commons, Databases and Information Systems Commons, and
the Economics Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact
scholarcommons@usf.edu.
Scholar Commons Citation
Paothong, Arnut, "Dynamic Processes in Network Goods: Modeling, Analysis and Applications" (2013). Graduate Theses and
Dissertations.
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/4558
  
 
 
Dynamic Processes in Network Goods: 
 
Modeling, Analysis and Applications 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
 
Arnut Paothong 
 
 
 
 
 
A dissertation submitted in particular fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Department of Mathematics 
College of Arts and Sciences 
University of South Florida 
 
 
 
Major professor: Gangaram S. Ladde, Ph.D. 
Chris P. Tsokos, Ph.D. 
Marcus S. McWaters, Ph.D. 
Kandethody Ramachandran, Ph.D. 
 
 
Date of Approval: 
March 4, 2013 
 
 
 
Keywords: Adaptive Expectation, Agent-Based Modeling Simulation, Consumer 
Decision Model, Local Network Externality, Principle of Network Externality 
 
Copyright  2013, Arnut Paothong 
  
  
 
DEDICATION 
 
I dedicate this dissertation to Jesus Christ for getting me through this experience. He 
gives me strength and encourages me even though I walked through the darkest valley. I 
also dedicate this work to my wife who has emotionally supported me. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Have I not commanded you? Be strong and courageous. Do not be afraid; do not be 
discouraged, for the Lord your God will be with you wherever you go.” (Joshua 1:9, 
NIV)  
  
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
First, I would like to express the deep and sincere gratitude to my major professor, 
Gangaram S. Ladde, Ph.D., who continuously and convincingly conveyed a spirit of 
adventure in regard to research. Without his guidance and persistence help, this 
dissertation seems to be impossible. 
Secondly, I would like to thank my dissertation committee members, Chris P. Tsokos, 
Marcus S. McWaters and Kandethody Ramachandran for their precious time and 
valuable suggestions during the preparation of the dissertation. 
Thirdly, I would like to thank for the financial support from Mathematical Sciences 
Division, US Army Research Office, Grant No. W911NF-12-1-0090. 
  
 i 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
List of Tables .......................................................................................................................v 
 
List of Figures ................................................................................................................... vii 
 
Abstract ................................................................................................................................x 
 
Chapter 1: Preliminary Concepts and Tools ........................................................................1 
 1.1 Network Externality Concepts ...........................................................................1 
  1.1.1 Definition of Network Externality ......................................................1 
   1.1.1.1 Metcalfe’s Law  ...................................................................2 
   1.1.1.2 Bandwagon Effect ................................................................2 
   1.1.1.3 Snob Effect...........................................................................2 
   1.1.1.4 Veblen Effect .......................................................................3 
   1.1.1.5 Cluster Effect .......................................................................3 
  1.1.2 Type of Network Externality ..............................................................3 
   1.1.2.1 Direct versus Indirect ...........................................................3 
   1.1.2.2 Local Network Externality ...................................................3 
  1.1.3. Source of Network Externality ..........................................................4 
   1.1.3.1 Exchange ..............................................................................4 
   1.1.3.2 Knowledge Base ..................................................................4 
   1.1.3.3 Switching Cost .....................................................................4 
   1.1.3.4 Complementary and Related Goods ....................................4 
 1.2 Mathematical Preliminaries ...............................................................................5 
  1.2.1 Mathematical Tools ............................................................................5 
   1.2.1.1 Existence of solution of algebraic equations .......................5 
   1.2.1.2 Testing stability of solution process ....................................6 
  1.2.2 Statistical Tools ...................................................................................7 
   1.2.2.1 Newton-Raphson Method ....................................................7 
   1.2.2.2 Homogeneity test .................................................................7 
  1.2.3 Programming and Simulation .............................................................8 
 
Chapter 2: Generalized Network Externality Function .......................................................9 
 2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................9 
 2.2 Network Externality Process............................................................................12 
 2.3 Properties of the Generalized Network Externality Function ..........................17 
  2.3.1 Admissible Market Share ..................................................................17 
  2.3.2 Switching Cost ..................................................................................17 
  2.3.3 Monotonicity .....................................................................................18 
  2.3.4 Law of Diminishing Return ..............................................................20 
 ii 
  2.3.5 Concavity ..........................................................................................23 
 2.4 Applications: Planning, Policy and Performance ............................................25 
 2.5 Conclusions ......................................................................................................32 
 
Chapter 3: Empirical Study of Generalized Network Externality Function ......................33 
 3.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................33 
 3.2 Statistical Modeling of US Banking Asset and Deposit ..................................34 
 3.3 Normalized US Banking Deposit Models........................................................36 
  3.3.1 Normalized US Banking Deposit Model (USBD Model) – I ...........37 
  3.3.2 Normalized US Banking Deposit Model (USBD Model) – II ..........38 
 3.4 US Banking Asset Network Externality Models .............................................38 
 3.5 Model Diagnostics ...........................................................................................40 
 3.6 Conclusions ......................................................................................................44 
 
Chapter 4: Adaptive Expectation for Network Goods .......................................................46 
 4.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................46 
 4.2 Dynamic Models of Rational and Static Expectation Processes .....................48 
  4.2.1 Rational Expectation (RE) ................................................................51 
  4.2.2 Static Expectation .............................................................................53 
 4.3 Dynamic Models of Adaptive Expectation Processes .....................................55 
  4.3.1 Current Adaptive Expectation (CAE) ...............................................56 
  4.3.2 Lagged Adaptive Expectation (LAE) ...............................................57 
 4.4 Stability ............................................................................................................59 
  4.4.1 Static Expectation (SE) .....................................................................59 
  4.4.2 Current Adaptive Expectation (CAE) ...............................................62 
  4.4.3 Lagged Adaptive Expectation (LAE) ...............................................65 
 4.5 Speed of Adjustment ........................................................................................66 
  4.5.1 Current Adaptive Expectation (CAE) ...............................................67 
  4.5.2 Lagged Adaptive Expectation (LAE) ...............................................69 
 4.6 Initial State .......................................................................................................73 
 4.7 Conclusions ......................................................................................................74 
 
Chapter 5: Agent-Based Modeling Simulation under Local Network Externality ............76 
 5.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................76 
 5.2 Development of Consumer Decision Model....................................................79 
  5.2.1 Network Structure .............................................................................79 
   5.2.1.1 Socio-cultural-economic Structure ....................................80 
   5.2.1.2 Technological Structure .....................................................80 
   5.2.1.3 Neighborhood and Consumer Decompositions .................81 
  5.2.2 Structure of Utility Function .............................................................82 
   5.2.2.1 Stand-Alone Value .............................................................83 
   5.2.2.2 Network Externality ...........................................................83 
   5.2.2.3 Compatibility Cost .............................................................84 
  5.2.3 Consumer Decision Rule ..................................................................85 
 5.3 Characteristics of Market Equilibrium.............................................................88 
  5.3.1 Market Share of Type-A Good .........................................................88 
 iii 
  5.3.2 Herfindahl–Hirschman Index............................................................88 
  5.3.3 Market Utility....................................................................................89 
 5.4 Agent-Based Modeling Simulation Model ......................................................90 
 5.5 Simulation Results ...........................................................................................93 
  5.5.1 Consumer Radius ..............................................................................93 
  5.5.2 Market Size .......................................................................................94 
  5.5.3 Initial Market Share ..........................................................................96 
  5.5.4 Price ..................................................................................................97 
  5.5.5 Strength of Stand-Alone Value .........................................................99 
  5.5.6 Strength of Network Externality .....................................................100 
  5.5.7 Strength of Compatibility ...............................................................101 
 5.6 Market Share and Policies .............................................................................103 
  5.6.1 Consumer Radius ............................................................................103 
  5.6.2 Market Size .....................................................................................103 
  5.6.3 Price ................................................................................................104 
  5.6.4 Strength of Stand-Alone Value .......................................................104 
  5.6.5 Strength of Network Externality .....................................................104 
  5.6.6 Strength of Compatibility ...............................................................105 
 5.7 Conclusions ....................................................................................................106 
 
Chapter 6: Multi-type Consumer Interactions under Local Network Externality ...........108 
 6.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................108 
 6.2 Development of Consumer Decision Model..................................................110 
  6.2.1 Network Structure ...........................................................................110 
   6.2.1.1 Socio-cultural-economic Structure ..................................111 
   6.2.1.2 Technological Structure ...................................................111 
   6.2.1.3 Neighborhood and Consumer Decompositions ...............112 
  6.2.2 Structure of Utility Function ...........................................................113 
   6.2.2.1 The stand-alone value ......................................................114 
   6.2.2.2 The network externality ...................................................114 
  6.2.3 Consumer Decision Rule ................................................................115 
 6.3 Characteristics of Market Equilibrium...........................................................117 
  6.3.1 Market Share of Good .....................................................................117 
  6.3.2 Herfindahl–Hirschman Index..........................................................118 
 6.4 Agent-Based Modeling Simulation Model ....................................................119 
 6.5 Simulation Results .........................................................................................121 
  6.5.1 Consumer Radius ............................................................................121 
  6.5.2 Initial Market Share ........................................................................122 
  6.5.3 Price ................................................................................................123 
  6.5.4 Strength of Stand-Alone Value .......................................................125 
  6.5.5 Strength of Network Externality .....................................................126 
 6.6 Conclusions ....................................................................................................127 
 
Chapter 7: Future Research Plan......................................................................................130 
 7.1 GNEF under Intervention Process .................................................................130 
 7.2 Further Extension of ABMS of Two Firms ...................................................130 
 iv 
 7.3 Further Extension of ABMS of Multi Firms..................................................131 
 
References ........................................................................................................................132 
 
Appendices .......................................................................................................................137 
 Appendix A: Expected Values of Characteristics of Market Equilibrium ..........137 
 Appendix B: Generating Random Points inside Convex M-Polygon .................139 
  
 v 
 
 
 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 2.1: Historical summary of network externality function under various 
assumptions ................................................................................................11 
 
Table 2.2: Effect of a parameter “ ” to the GNEF’s shape at various   ....................28 
 
Table 2.3: Effect of a parameter “ ” to the GNEF’s shape at various   ....................28 
 
Table 2.4: Effect of a parameter “ ” to the GNEF’s shape at various   .....................29 
 
Table 2.5: Effect of a parameter “ ” to the GNEF’s shape at various   ....................29 
 
Table 2.6: Effect of the initial parameter    to the GNEF’s shape at various   .........30 
 
Table 3.1: Estimated parameters of US banking asset and deposit model ..................35 
 
Table 3.2: Estimated parameters of USBANE Models ...............................................40 
 
Table 3.3: Homogeneity test:   statistics and p-values ..............................................42 
 
Table 3.4: Normality test:  statistics and p-values ..................................................44 
 
Table 4.1: Meaning and equilibrium condition of all processes .................................58 
 
Table 4.2: Stability of equilibrium state and oscillation of all processes....................72 
 
Table 5.1: Network attributes of ABMS for two firms ...............................................86 
 
Table 5.2: Decision of the sixth consumer for Illustration 5.2.1.................................87 
 
Table 5.3: Value of three characteristics at the initial time and dominant 
situation ......................................................................................................90 
 
Table 5.4: Specific value of Table 5.3 for scenario 5.5.1 ...........................................93 
 
Table 5.5: Specific value of Table 5.3 for scenario 5.5.2 ...........................................95 
 
Table 5.6: Specific value of Table 5.3 for scenario 5.5.3 ...........................................96 
 
Table 5.7: Specific value of Table 5.3 for scenario 5.5.4 ...........................................98 
 vi 
Table 5.8: Specific value of Table 5.3 for scenario 5.5.5 ...........................................99 
 
Table 5.9: Specific value of Table 5.3 for scenario 5.5.6 .........................................100 
 
Table 5.10: Specific value of Table 5.3 for scenario 5.5.7 .........................................102 
 
Table 5.11: Strategies of large firm to monopolize and small firm to survive ...........107 
 
Table 6.1: Network attributes of ABMS for M firms ...............................................116 
 
Table 6.2: Decision of the first consumer for Illustration 6.2.1 ................................117 
 
Table 6.3: Value of two characteristics at the initial time and dominant 
situation ....................................................................................................119 
 
Table 6.4: Strategies of firm to monopolize and survive in the market ....................129 
  
 vii 
 
 
 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 2.1: Sketches of the shape of GNEF .................................................................18 
 
Figure 2.2: Sketches of the shape of GNEF, illustrating the role of   .........................20 
 
Figure 2.3: Sketches of the shape of GNEF, illustrating the role of    ........................24 
 
Figure 2.4: Control region of various parameters ........................................................31 
 
Figure 3.1: Plot of weekly US banking asset and deposit ............................................34 
 
Figure 3.2: Curve fitting of the US banking asset and deposit .....................................36 
 
Figure 3.3: Curve fitting of USBANE: indirect approach ............................................40 
 
Figure 3.4: Plot of residuals vs time .............................................................................41 
 
Figure 3.5: Plot of standardized residuals vs fitted value .............................................41 
 
Figure 3.6: QQ Plot of standardized residuals ..............................................................43 
 
Figure 3.7: Histogram of standardized residuals ..........................................................43 
 
Figure 4.1: Sketches of GNEF and pdf of consumer’s individual preference ..............50 
 
Figure 4.2: Sketches of GNEF, pdf of the consumer’s individual preference 
and function   for Illustration 4.2.1 ...........................................................53 
 
Figure 4.3: Adjustment process of stable equilibrium state: graphical method ...........55 
 
Figure 4.4: Stability and oscillating regions of CAE process ......................................69 
 
Figure 4.5: Stability and oscillating regions of various processes ...............................71 
 
Figure 4.6: Stability and oscillating regions of all processes .......................................71 
 
Figure 4.7: Solution path for various initial points.......................................................73 
 
Figure 4.8: Phase diagram for various initial points of LAE process ..........................74 
  
 viii 
Figure 5.1: Image of Hotelling location line model .....................................................81 
 
Figure 5.2: Graphs of network externality and scale function .....................................84 
 
Figure 5.3: Image of network attributes for Illustration 5.2.1 ......................................86 
 
Figure 5.4: Flow chart of ABMS for two firms............................................................92 
 
Figure 5.5: Simulated result showing influence of consumer radius on three 
characteristics .............................................................................................94 
 
Figure 5.6: Simulated result showing influence of market size on three 
characteristics .............................................................................................95 
 
Figure 5.7: Simulated result showing influence of initial market share on three 
characteristics .............................................................................................96 
 
Figure 5.8: Simulated result showing influence of price on three characteristics ........98 
 
Figure 5.9: Simulated result showing influence of strength of stand-alone 
value on three characteristics .....................................................................99 
 
Figure 5.10: Simulated result showing influence of strength of network 
externality on three characteristics ...........................................................101 
 
Figure 5.11: Simulated result showing influence of strength of compatibility on 
three characteristics ..................................................................................102 
 
Figure 5.12: Simulated result showing 3D plots of market share versus 
probability of consumer type and the other network attributes ...............105 
 
Figure 6.1: Image of location model for 3 firms ........................................................112 
 
Figure 6.2: Image of network attributes for Illustration 6.2.1 ....................................116 
 
Figure 6.3: Expectation of HHI at the initial time for                  ............118 
 
Figure 6.4: Flow chart of ABMS for M firms ............................................................121 
 
Figure 6.5: Simulated result showing influence of consumer radius on two 
characteristics ...........................................................................................122 
 
Figure 6.6: Simulated result showing influence of initial market share of    on 
two characteristics ....................................................................................123 
 
Figure 6.7: Simulated result showing influence of price on two characteristics ........124 
 ix 
 
Figure 6.8: Simulated result showing influence of strength of stand-alone 
value on two characteristics .....................................................................125 
 
Figure 6.9: Simulated result showing influence of strength of network 
externality on two characteristics.............................................................127 
 
Figure B.1: Illustration of notation for convex  -gon .................................................140 
 
Figure B.2: Illustration of Weisstein’s methodology ..................................................141 
 
 
  
 x 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The network externality function plays a very important role in the study of economic 
network industries. Moreover, the consumer group dynamic interactions coupled with 
network externality concept is going to play a dominant role in the network goods in the 
21st century. The existing literature is stemmed on a choice of externality function with 
certain quantitative properties. The utility function coupled with the network externality 
function is used to investigate static properties of rational equilibrium. The aim of this 
work is to systematically initiate a development of quantitative effects of the concept of 
network externality and its influence on the characteristics of network market 
equilibrium. 
We introduce several basic concepts, notably, network externality process and network 
goods. Formulating a principle of network externality, we developed a mathematical 
dynamic model (1) for the network externality process. A closed form solution of the 
mathematical model was determined and analyzed (2). The presented qualitative and 
quantitative analysis provides a systematic and unified way of constructing the existing 
network externality function. The solution process is called “Generalized Network 
Externality Function (GNEF)”. Moreover, our study of quantitative description, 
parametric representation of attributes and sensitivity analysis of network externality 
process provides a tool for planning, policy and performance for network goods (3). 
 xi 
In the absence of desired data set, we presented an illustration to exhibit the significance 
of GNEF. We used two types of data sets on the US banking asset and deposit. 
Employing nonlinear regression methods and data sets, we developed statistical models 
for the US banking asset and deposit, and constructed two normalized the US banking 
deposit models (4). Finally, using the concept of theory of relative growth and GNEF (4), 
we developed two dynamic models for the network externality for the US banking asset 
with respect to the US banking deposit as a financial market share (5). 
Incorporating the GNEF (2) in the consumer utility function, a concept of market share 
adjustment function is introduced and utilized to develop dynamic models for existing 
rational and static expectation processes (6). In fact, the role and scope of dynamic 
models of market share adjustment process are extended to the well-known adaptive 
expectation and its extension process (7). Using a fixed point theorem and the method of 
upper and lower solutions of discrete time processes, the existence of equilibrium states 
of developed dynamic models of market share adjustment processes are established in a 
systematic way (8). Furthermore, the qualitative properties (stability and oscillatory) of 
equilibrium states are investigated in terms of model and speed of adjustment parameters. 
Moreover, the system parameter space is decomposed according to qualitative properties 
(stability, instability and oscillatory) and the type of expectation processes. 
Very recently, the idea of local network externality is utilized to characterize the rational 
equilibrium (under fulfilled expectation assumptions). From the study on two-scale 
network dynamic model of human mobility process an eco-socio-culture interactions, we 
note that heterogeneity in the network goods consumer community generates a local 
network externality. Furthermore, dynamic models of adaptive expectation processes 
 xii 
(6,7) for network goods provide tool to extend the characterization of rational equilibrium 
study to static, current and lagged adaptive types equilibriums. Here, we treat the 
consumer decision to be a dynamic process. We formulate a dynamic structural 
representation of a consumer network structure, structure of utility function and decision 
rule under the influence of local network externality concept (9). For the consumer 
network structure, we generalize the one-dimensional Hotelling location line model to 
multi-dimensional location (10). This formulation generates a mathematical model for a 
consumer decision dynamic process (11). The byproduct of the dynamic model leads to 
an agent-based simulation model (12). The simulation model is employed to investigate 
different types of consumer decision dynamic market equilibriums. Moreover, prototype 
illustrations are given to exhibit the association between network attributes and its market 
equilibriums.  
We extend the work of two firms (duopoly) into multi-firms (oligopoly and monopolistic 
competition). This work shed light on the policies for manager to meet performance goal 
of their firm in network goods industry. 
In future, we propose to extend this work to incorporate random fluctuations, to remove 
restrictions and the local and global economic framework in the 21st century. 
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CHAPTER 1  
PRELIMINARY CONCEPTS AND TOOLS 
 
This chapter deals with a basic preliminary concepts and tools needed to undertake the 
study of network externality process. It is obvious that the usefulness of fax machine 
depends on the number of machines because users have more channels to contact. There 
are some goods and services that have this property, that is, consumer’s utility will be 
affected by the number of consumers who consume the same goods and services. In 
economics, this positive influence is called network externality. The goods and services 
characterized by such property are called network goods. In this chapter, definition, type 
and source of network externality are reviewed in Section 1.1. Some tools in this 
dissertation are briefed in Section 1.2. 
 
1.1 Network Externality Concepts 
1.1.1 Definition of Network Externality 
Network externality is composed of two economics terms “network” and “externality”. 
First, the term “Network” refers to a group of interacting consumers of similar goods and 
services. Second, the term “Externality” is a well-known term in economics (Bishop, 
2009) which means an additional benefit or cost created by unrelated third parties. For 
example, pollutant emitted by a factory creates negative externality to nearby residents 
for their health whereas planting tree creates positive externality. Moreover, some 
 2 
activities create both positive and negative such as singing a song, slow driving. Thus, the 
term “Network Externality” shortly means an additional benefit or cost created by 
network. 
The interaction inside the consumer network creates externality to the members of 
network. Thus, the larger size of membership in the network generates the greater 
externality, that is, the magnitude of network externality increases when the size of 
network increases. Alternatively, there is another term used, “network effect”, 
interchangeably. Liebowitz and Margolis (1995) discuss their differences. In this work, 
the “Network Externality” term is used. In the following, we review some related terms 
to network externality: 
1.1.1.1 Metcalfe’s Law  
The value of network is proportional to the square of network size because a network size 
  has 
 (   )
 
 possible unique connections. See Metacafe (1995). 
1.1.1.2 Bandwagon Effect 
People do something because others are doing it, regardless of their own belief. This is 
referred as the “bandwagon effect”. For example, once a particular good or service 
becomes popular, more people tend to buy it, too. See Colman (2009). 
1.1.1.3 Snob Effect 
The value of item increases as the availability decreases. This is called “snob effect”. For 
examples, art works, rare stamps and coins. This concept relates to the negative network 
externality. See Leibenstein (1950). 
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1.1.1.4 Veblen Effect 
Thorstein Veblen (1899) argued that wealthy individuals often consume highly 
conspicuous goods in order to advertise their wealth, thereby achieving greater social 
status. 
1.1.1.5 Cluster Effect 
The congregation of consumers and producers of a particular good or service induces 
other consumers and producers to relocate there. This is known as the “cluster effect”. 
1.1.2 Type of Network Externality 
1.1.2.1 Direct versus Indirect 
The term “Direct” refers to the network externality through the usefulness of goods such 
as fax machine, e-mail, telephone, etc. While the term “Indirect” refers to the network 
externality through its complementary goods and related goods which can in turn the 
value of the original goods. For instance, when number of iPhone user increase, 
developers have motivation to create more applications which is increase the value of 
iPhone. See more Katz and Shapiro (1994). 
1.1.2.2 Local Network Externality 
The term “Local” refers to the consumer’s utility is affected by the size of neighbor rather 
than entire network. For example, a decision of programmer to choose programming 
software is affected by what software that his neighbor used the most. The usage of the 
whole market has less effect than the usage of his neighbor (Banerji and Dutta (2009)). 
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1.1.3. Source of Network Externality 
1.1.3.1 Exchange 
Facebook without friend is almost useless. The utility from Facebook depends on the 
number of your friends because we have more channels to interact. For some goods, the 
interactions inside network create additional benefit to the member of network 
(Gallaugher (2012)). 
1.1.3.2 Knowledge Base 
A discussion forum of a particular good gives much useful information about the good. 
For a large network, the experienced users usually help new users through an organized 
discussion forum. Consequently, a new consumer is induced to buy a good that has a 
larger network. 
1.1.3.3 Switching Cost 
Imagine you were expert in the Windows OS, will you buy a MacBook Pro? The answer 
is “No”, because you don’t want to spend your time to learn how to use the Mac OS. 
However, you might buy it, if you know that the Windows OS is dying. Consequently, at 
the first time of learning, you will choose the operating system (OS) that has a larger 
network because it will not die soon, (Shapiro and Varian (1999)). 
1.1.3.4 Complementary and Related Goods 
Complementary and related goods add more benefit to the good. A millions of 
applications, songs and Podcasts in iTunes enhance the value of choosing 
iPhone/iPad/iPod over a rival like the Microsoft Zune. And again, the larger network 
usually offers a larger add-on market (Gallaugher (2012)). 
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1.2 Mathematical Preliminaries 
In this dissertation, we develop a dynamic model for the network goods. We employ 
mathematical results to develop the theoretical algorithms (theorems/corollaries). We 
utilize the statistical methods to estimate and to test the parameters to validate the 
theoretical modeling. Finally, in absence of data set, we use programming and simulation 
to validate the model and draw a few inferences. 
1.2.1 Mathematical Tools 
1.2.1.1 Existence of solution of algebraic equations 
Definition 1.2.1 Let        be such that    . Then     are said to be coupled 
lower and upper quasisolutions of  ( )    if     (   [ ]   [ ]  )  or   
  (   [ ]   [ ]  ). 
The following theorem provides the existence of solution of algebraic equations. 
Theorem 1.6.1 in Ladde et al (1985) 
Assume that    [     ]  and process a mixed quasimonotone property. Suppose 
further that     are coupled lower and upper quasisolutions of  ( )    and 
  (   [ ]   [ ]  )    ( ̅  [ ]   [ ]  )     (    ̅ ) 
whenever    ̅      and    . Then there exist monotone sequences {  } {  } 
such that           as     and     are coupled minimal and maximal solutions 
of  ( )    such that           for any solutions,  . 
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1.2.1.2 Testing stability of solution process 
The following results provides a mathematical tool to establish the stability of the 
equilibrium states (solutions of algebraic equations associated with the rate functions in 
dynamic models) of systems. 
Theorem 1.2.2 in Ladde and Sambandham (1985) 
Let  ( ) be a sequence of m-dimensional random vectors such that 
    ( )   (    ( )  ) 
Let   ( ) be the solution process of  
    ( )   (    ( )  ),    ( )    ( ) 
where  (     )     is a sequence of Borel measurable functions on     
  
satisfying the following relation 
 (     )   (     )      for     
Then 
  ( )    ( )    for    (    ) 
provided 
   ( )     ( ) 
Corollary 1.2.3 If  ( )   ( )   ( )   [    ], and  ( ) satisfy an inequality 
  ( )    ( )    ( )    ( ) 
Then 
  ( )     ( )∏   ( )
 
      
 ∑   ( )∏   ( )
 
     
 
      
  
and moreover 
  ( )     ( )   [∑ (  ( )   )
 
      
]  ∑   ( )   [∑ (  ( )   )
 
     ]
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1.2.2 Statistical Tools 
1.2.2.1 Newton-Raphson Method  
The Gauss-Newton method for estimating nonlinear parameters can be considered as a 
special case of the more general Newton-Raphson method (Seber and Wild (1989)). The 
Newton-Raphson method uses a local quadratic approximation of an objective function. 
1.2.2.2 Homogeneity tes( 
For homogeneity test (Endrenyi and Kwong (1981)), first, we ﬁt the model, and then 
order the residuals as  ̂( )  ̂( )    ̂( ) . Secondly, we compute the ratio of the last   
squared residuals to the ﬁrst   squared residuals. The suggestion for   is   
   
 
. Under 
these considerations, the homogeneity test is as follow:  
      (  )   
  vs       (  )   
  
  
∑  ̂( )
  
       
∑  ̂( )
  
   
          
1.2.2.3 Normality test 
For normality test (Shapiro and Wilk (2008)), the null and alternative hypothesis are: 
   The random sample,           , is drawn from normally distributed population 
   The random sample,           , is not drawn from normally distributed population. 
We compute   
∑    ( )
 
   
∑ ( ( )  ̅)
  
   
   where  ( )  is order statistic for          ;  ̅  is the 
sample mean. (       )  
     
(         )
 
 
, where  (       )
  
        are the expected values of the order statistics of independent and identically 
distributed random sample from the standard normal distribution, and   is     
covariance matrix of the order statistics.  
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1.2.3 Programming and Simulation 
To obtain the market equilibrium state of the developed dynamic model, we utilize the 
agent-based modeling simulation (ABMS, Axelord (1997)). Agent-based modeling 
simulation is a recently introduced simulation approach to analyze enter-agent 
interactions. There are at least three advantages of the ABMS. First, its assumptions 
underlying the model are simple. Simplicity is also helpful for readers to understand and 
for researcher to extend the model. Secondly, the complex adaptive process belongs to 
the work of simulation. Thus, complex tools aren’t needed here. Thirdly, because of 
ABMS, all network attributes are traceable from initial state to steady state. The ABMS is 
more feasible. It is based on certain assumptions and adaptable attributes of agents. 
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CHAPTER 2  
GENERALIZED NETWORK EXTERNALITY FUNCTION 
 
In this chapter, we focus on the development of mathematical modeling of network 
externality processes. The introduction of the generalized network externality function 
provides a unified source of a tool for developing and analyzing the planning, policy and 
performance of the network externality process and network goods in a systematic way. 
This leads to fulfill all existing network externality assumptions as special cases. We 
study its properties and applications. This study provides quantitative descriptions, 
parametric representations of attributes and sensitivity analysis of network externality 
processes. In particular, parametric variations characterize planning, policy and 
performance for network goods. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In the study of network industries and sciences, the network externality function plays a 
very significant role. This function coupled with supply and demand functions is 
successfully utilized in the study of economics of network industries (Shy, 2001). We 
remark that the concept of network externality was introduced by Bell’s employee, N. 
Lytkins (1917). Historically, the network externality function is motivated by its 
usefulness in economics. Moreover, the development of the research in this area is 
centered on the augmentations of qualitative properties of the network externality 
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function (Economides (1996); Church and Gandal (1992); Economides and Viard, 
(2003); Gottinger (2003); Bayer and Chan (2007); Ben-Zion and Tavor (2006); von 
Seggern, (2007). A further relevant historical developments and results are summarized 
in the following.  
The network externality function (Katz and Shapiro, 1986) is the function that describes 
the relationship between network value and its corresponding size. Let   be market share 
of a network good,       be the network externality function and  ( )  be the 
network externality value. From the definition of network externality function 
(Economides, 1996), we note that the network externality value increases when the size 
of market share increases, that is, the first derivative of   is positive, and hence 
  ( )   . (2.1.1) 
The early existing research work in the area of network externality function is centered 
on the linearity assumption on externality function: 
 ( )    . (2.1.2) 
For more details see Church and Gandal (1992), Economides and Viard (2003), Gottinger 
(2003), Bayer and Chan (2007). 
The idea of diminishing return was incorporated into the network externality function by 
Ben-Zion and Tavor (2006). Furthermore, the first derivative of function approaches to 
zero when the market share is very large, that is, 
         ( )     (2.1.3) 
Recently, Lin (2008) has considered the following flexible functional form of network 
externality function: 
 ( )   (    ).  (2.1.4) 
The expression for   in (1.4) was based on the following qualitative properties: 
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1. Negatively marginal function,   ( )   ; 
2.   is concave function when      ; 
3.   is convex function when    ; 
4.   is linear function when    . 
Moreover, Hans-Werner Gottinger (2003) has classified the network externality function 
into categories, namely, linear, logarithmic and exponential functional forms. See Table 
2.1. The linear function postulates that, as the network grows, the marginal value 
approaches to a constant. The logarithmic function postulates that, as a network grows, 
the marginal value diminishes. In this formulation, network externality at the limit must 
be either negative or zero. The exponential function postulates that, as a network grows, 
the marginal value increases. This type of network externality function is referred to as 
‘Metcalfe’s Law, Robert Metcalfe (1995).  
Table 2.1 Historical summary of network externality function under various assumptions 
 
Assumption Sign of    ( ) Graphical Shape 
I Zero Line 
II Negative Concave 
III Positive Convex 
 
In this chapter, we recognize the rapid growth in communication, science and technology 
in the 21st century. The international activities are significantly increasing. The different 
types of consumers (local/global level) are able to interact with each other easily and 
more frequently. We further recognize the ideas of Katz and Shapiro (1986), Economides 
(1996), Lin (2008), von Seggern (2007), Ben-Zion and Tavor (2006), Gottinger (2003) 
and the historical assumptions regarding the various forms of network externality 
functions. We observe that the group dynamic interactions (Ladde et al, 2012) are going 
to play a significant role in network goods in the 21st century. The idea of a group 
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dynamic coupled with the network externality concept leads to a notion of network 
externality process. This further strengthens our motivation to undertake a study of the 
development of dynamic model of network externality process, its fundamental 
properties and significance. In Section 2.2, we present a principle of network externality 
process and develop a mathematical model. Using the mathematical model of network 
externality process, we study the properties of network externality function in Section 
2.3. In Section 2.4, we briefly outline the significance of the dynamic model of network 
externality process, in particular, parametric variation analysis to characterize the various 
aspects of network externality process, namely, planning, policy and performance. The 
role, scope and future directions of the research are outline in Section 2.5. 
 
2.2 Network Externality Process 
In this section, we formally introduce a few terms: consumer network, network goods and 
network externality process. We consider a consumer/user network as a group of 
interacting consumers/users of similar goods/services/information/knowledge/entities. 
The similar good under the discussion of consumer network is referred to as a network 
good. The consumer group interacting process of network goods is called a network 
externality process. Network externality processes influence the values of network goods. 
The value of network goods is influenced by both consumer demand-supply functions as 
well as the network externality process. The influence of network externality process of 
the network goods is measured by the consumer/user network size/share. The value of a 
network good influenced by a network externality process is called network externality 
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value. It is determined by the current market size/share. This process leads to the well-
known definition of network externality function (Katz and Shapiro, 1986). 
Example 2.2.1 Let us consider a game console as a network good. The consumer 
network is a group of consumers who purchased a game console (Xbox/PS3/Wii). Here, 
Xbox/PS3/Wii are network goods. The network externality process is the consumer group 
interactions such as sharing their games, accessories, knowledge, experiences and 
opinions about the game console. The network externality value is the value of a game 
console generated by this group’s interaction process. 
Example 2.2.2 Let us consider Microsoft Word. We know that when the number of 
Microsoft Word users increase, the value of goods will increase. This is due to the fact 
that they have more channels to share their files. In this case, Microsoft Word is a 
network good. 
Example 2.2.3 Let us consider a rare good for example an antique. When the number of 
owners increases, the value of goods must decrease. Thus, the taste of valuable features 
of the goods diminishes. In this case, the antique is a network good. 
On the basis of the work (Ben-Zion and Tavor, 2006), we noted that as the market 
share/size increases the network externality value approaches to one of the two distinct 
critical levels in a monotonic manner. This leads to concepts of lower and upper limits of 
the network externality process. 
Definition 2.2.1 The Lower Limit of Network Externality Value is the greatest lower 
bound (     ) or the infimum of range of network externality function,      . 
Definition 2.2.2 The Upper Limit of Network Externality Value is the least upper bound 
(     ) or the supremum of the range of the network externality function,      . 
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Remark 2.2.1 The Lower and upper limits of network externality values are referred to 
as stationary/equilibrium states of network externality process. 
Definition 2.2.3 The Excess Network Externality is the difference (relative change) 
between the current state and the lower limit of the network externality process. 
Definition 2.2.4 The Deficit Network Externality is the difference (relative change) 
between the upper limit and the current state of the network externality process. 
In the following, we provide examples to illustrate the above presented concepts. 
Example 2.2.4 From Example 2.2.2, we interpret the lower limit as the minimum value 
of goods at the minimum level of market share and the upper limit as the maximum value 
of goods at maximum level of market share. The excess network externality is a degree of 
the value when the market share is not low. The deficit network externality is the loss of 
the value when the market share is not high. For more examples, see Shy (2001). 
Example 2.2.5 From Example 2.2.3, we interpret the lower and upper limits as the 
threshold values of the affinity/taste of valuable features. The excess network externality 
is level of affinity/taste when market share is not very large. The deficit network 
externality is loss of affinity/taste when market share is not very low. 
On the basis of the above development and based on historical assumptions on the 
network externality value, Katz and Shapiro (1986), Economides (1996), Ben-Zion and 
Tavor (2006),Lin (2008), Gottinger (2003), we state a principle of network externality 
process. Moreover, we develop a mathematical model for network externality process. 
This development provides the quantitative description about the historical assumptions 
regarding the network externality function, the parametric representation of attributes of 
network externality process and planning, policy and performance. 
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Principle of Network Externality Process: The rate of change of network externality of 
network goods is directly proportional to the product of the excess network externality 
per unit of current/used market share and the deficit network externality per unit of 
unused market share. 
Development dynamic model of network externality process: Let  ,   and   be the 
network externality, the lower and upper limits of network externality process, 
respectively, for network goods. Thus,     is the excess network externality, and     
is the deficit network externality of the network goods. Consequently, 
   
 
 is the excess 
network externality per used market share, and 
   
   
 is deficit network externality per 
unused market share. By the principle of network externality process, the dynamic of 
network externality process is described by 
    
(   )
 
(   )
   
  .  (2.2.1) 
where    , and   is a constant of proportionality, and the sign of   depends on the 
types of network goods;      ,       and  (  )     is the initial value of the 
network externality function of the network goods at its initial market share,     . By 
solving this differential equation, we have the closed form expression for the network 
externality function: 
 (       )    
   
  (
    
    
)(
    
  
)
 (   )
(
 
   
)
 (   )        (   ).  (2.2.2) 
Remark 2.2.2 For a newly introduced network goods, that is comparable to existing 
network goods, it is reasonably realistic to have an available market share. For this 
purpose, we can relax the domain of definition restriction in (2.2.2). Let   and   be 
numbers between zero and one, representing minimum and maximum market shares of a 
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given network good, respectively. Under this modified domain, the modified version of 
(2.2.1) is obtained by replacing 
(   )
 
 and 
(   )
   
 in (2.2.1) by (
   
   
)  and (
   
   
) , 
respectively. Hence, 
    (
   
   
) (
   
   
)   ,  (2.2.3a) 
and 
 (       )    
   
  (
    
    
)(
    
    
)
 (
   
   
)
(
   
   
)
 (
   
   
)
 , for   (   ).  
(2.2.3b) 
The function   in (2.2.3b) is called generalized network externality function (GNEF). 
Remark 2.2.3 We can also consider the domain of (2.2.3b) in terms of market size. Let  
be the current market size and    be number of potential consumers in the market. The 
relationship between market size and market share for the same single network good can 
be expressed by   
 
  
, where   is the market share as defined before. The differential 
equation (2.2.3a) is reduced to 
      
(   )
(     )
(   )
(     )
        (       ).  (2.2.3c) 
Remark 2.2.4 If the market share has a natural growth that is described by the Verhulst-
Pearl population dynamic model (Ladde et al, 2012)      (   )(   )   (its 
solution is a Sigmoid curve). From (2.2.3a), the network externality value will also have a 
natural growth, described by      (   )(   )  . In other words, the differential 
equation (2.2.3a) is a relative growth rate model (Huxley, 1932; Robert Rosen, 1967 and 
Ladde et al, 2012) with respect to the market share and network externality value. 
Remark 2.2.5 If we assume    ,    ,         ( )    and,         ( )   , 
then the GNEF fulfills the properties of a cumulative distribution function (CDF). 
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Remark 2.2.6 We further note that there are five and seven parameters in (2.2.2) and 
(2.2.3b), respectively. These parameters play an important role in analyzing: planning, 
policy and performance aspects of network goods. 
 
2.3 Properties of the Generalized Network Externality Function 
In this section, we present the qualitative properties of the GNEF. These properties shed a 
light on the historical assumptions (Economide (1996), Ben-Zion and Tavor (2006)) that 
are made about the network externality function. In fact, the function determined by 
differential equation (2.2.3a) possesses all the specified properties of network externality 
function in the literature (Gottinger, (2003), Lin (2008)) in systematic and unified way. 
2.3.1 Admissible Market Share: For network goods, the domain of GNEF (2.2.3b) and 
(2.2.3c) are    (   )  (   ) and (  
     )  (    ), respectively. 
2.3.2 Switching Cost: The range of both GNEF (2.2.3b) and (2.2.3c) for the network 
externality goods is    (   ). The parameter     can be considered as the switching 
cost/the minimum threshold for existence of the network goods in the market. The 
concept of switching cost is defined by Thompson and Cats-Baril (2002) as “the costs 
associated with switching supplier”. For example, in the case of telephone as a network 
good, the switching cost includes the efforts needed to inform friends and relatives about 
a new telephone number. The operator switching cost is related to learning about how to 
use the interface of a new mobile phone from different brands. Moreover, in the case of 
electricity as a network good, the cost includes the lost time due to the paperwork 
necessary when switching to a new electricity provider. Types of switching costs include: 
exit fees, search costs, learning costs, cognitive efforts, emotional costs, equipment costs, 
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installation and start-up costs, financial risk, psychological risk and social risk. In short, 
the parameter “ ” can be considered as “planning parameter” to enter the network goods. 
2.3.3 Monotonicity: The introduction of network externality principle leads to the two 
types of following concepts: (i) the positive marginal network externality and (ii) the 
negative marginal network externality. From the domain and range of GNEF, we observe 
that the expressions 
(   )
(   )
(   )
(   )
 and 
(   )
(     )
(   )
(     )
 in (2.2.3a) and (2.2.3c) are positive. 
Hence, if      then 
  
  
   (    
  
  
  ). In this case,   is referred to as a positive 
marginal network externality function. The network externality value increases as the 
market share/size increases, that is,   is an increasing function on (   ) 
(    (       )). On the other hand, if    , then 
  
  
   (    
  
  
  ). In this case, 
  is referred to as a negative marginal network externality function. Thus, the network 
externality function decreases as the market share/size increases, that is,   is a decreasing 
function on (   ) (    (       )). For both types of marginal network externality 
process,   is the monotonic function with the greatest lower bound   and the least upper 
bound  . See Figure 2.1. 
  
(a) (b) 
 
Figure 2.1 Sketches of the shape of GNEF, illustrating of (2.2.3b) for (a)     and (b) 
   .  
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In fact, a graphic illustration for fulfilling all properties of function in (2.2.3b) with the 
domain between   and  , lower limit  , upper limit   , inflection point (point of 
diminishing return) (    (  )), and increasing/decreasing (depending on the sign of  ). 
Remark 2.3.1 Example 2.2.2 and Example 2.2.3 have positive and negative marginal 
network externality, respectively. 
Remark 2.3.2 From the above discussion, we note that the development of network 
externality function in Section 2.2 with     possesses all properties that were outlined 
by Lin (2008), in systematic and unified way. Moreover, the types of network goods can 
be directly verified by the sign of the first derivative. The first derivative of   in (2.2.3b) 
is  
  ( )  
 (
    
    
)(
    
    
)
 (
   
   
)
(
   
   
)
 
[
 
 
 
 
  (
    
    
)(
    
    
)
 (
   
   
)
(
   
   
)
 (
   
   
)
]
 
 
 
 
 (
   
   
)
 (
   
   
)  
.  
(2.3.1) 
For          and         , if     then   ( )   , and if     then 
  ( )   . In short, the sign of constant of proportionality   represents the types of 
network goods. 
In order to illustrate the remaining assumptions in Table 2.1, we need to introduce the 
following notation and derive some expressions. We define 
  (
    
    
) (
    
    
)
 (
   
   
)
.  (2.3.2) 
For     and   
   
 
, (2.3.1) is reduced to 
  (
   
 
)   (
   
   
)
 
.  (2.3.3) 
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Thus, the constant of proportionality   relates to the speed of change or slope at point 
  
   
 
 when    , see detail Figure 2.2. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Sketches of the shape of GNEF, illustrating the role of   when       
             ,                             . 
 
2.3.4 Law of Diminishing Return: The law of diminishing return is utilized in almost all 
aspects of economics. This concept is also used to study the network goods (Ben-Zion 
and Travor, 2006). In the literature, the network externality function is assumed to satisfy 
diminishing return assumption together with          ( )   . In order to justify the 
validity of this property, we need to introduce a couple concepts. 
Definition 2.3.1 The Lower-Left Terminal Point (LLTP) is a pair of the greatest lower 
bounds of the domain and range of the network externality function. Hence, the LLTP of 
GNEF is (           )  (   ). 
Definition 2.3.2 The Upper-Right Terminal Point (URTP) is a pair of the least upper 
bounds of the domain and range of network externality function. Hence, the URTP of 
GNEF is (           )  (   ). 
Let   be the reference line connecting the two points, (   ) and (   ). The equation of   
is  ( )    (   )   , where   
   
   
, and it is the slope of the line  . Moreover, this 
slope is the ratio of the range of network externality with the range of available market 
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share for the network goods. This can be interpreted as the maximum excess network 
externality per unit range of the market share. We introduce   as the network externality 
index (NEI) of a network goods. 
Proposition 2.3.1 For   
   
   
 and (   ( ))  (   )  (   ). 
1. If | |    , then          ( )           ( )     
2. If | |    , then          ( )           ( )       
Proof From (2.3.2), (2.3.1) is reduced to,   ( )    (   ) 
(   )     (   )     
[(   )     (   )   ]
 ,  
When     ,          ( )           (   ) (   )            
(   )     
[(   )     (   )   ]
 . 
When     ,          ( )           (   ) (   )            
(   )     
[(   )     (   )   ]
 . 
For    ,if      ,then          ( )    and if      , then          ( )   . 
For    ,if      ,then          ( )    and if      , then          ( )   . 
For    , by the l'Hôpital's rule, 
         ( )           (   )
 (   )            
     
[(   )(   )     (   )     ]
. 
         ( )           (   )
 (   )            
     
[(   )       (   )(   )     ]
. 
If       , then          ( )     and if       , then          ( )   . 
If       , then          ( )     and if       , then          ( )   . 
Remark 2.3.3 The byproduct of Proposition 2.3.1 is that the rate of change of GNEF 
converges to zero at   and   from the right and left, respectively, whenever | |    . In 
fact,          ( )    and          ( )   . 
We further note that depending on the positive or negative marginal network externality 
and for | |    , we have corresponding two types of laws of diminishing returns, 
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namely, positively and negatively diminishing returns. Moreover, from the above 
discussion, the positively and negatively diminishing returns are characterized by 
   
   
 
 
  
[ 
(   )
(   )
(   )
(   )
] {
  
  
  
         
         
, for     and       (2.3.4a) 
(concave up to concave down) 
   
   
 
 
  
[ 
(   )
(   )
(   )
(   )
] {
  
  
  
         
         
, for     and       .  (2.3.4b) 
(concave down to concave up) 
respectively, where (    (  )) is referred as a point of inflection. See Figure 2.1. 
Illustration 2.3.1 A law of positively diminishing return in economics states that as a 
person increases his/her consumption of a product/good - while keeping the consumption 
of other products constant, there is a decline in the marginal utility that person derives 
from consuming each additional unit of that product (Samuelson and Nordhaus, 2009). 
The same empirical economics principle is applicable here, when market share increases 
- while keeping the other factors constant, there is a decline in the marginal value of 
network externality, that is, when market share passes the critical size the second 
derivative of network externality function will be less than zero,    ( )   ;       . 
A law of negatively diminishing return can be illustrated, analogously. The Figure 2.1a 
further illustrates the concept of positively diminishing return, that is, geometrically, the 
point of inflection at which the concavity changes from the concave up to the concave 
down. The Figure 2.1b illustrates the feature of negatively diminishing curve, that is, the 
point of inflection at which the concavity changes from the concave down to the concave 
up. 
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2.3.5 Concavity: The shape and concavity of GNEF is determined by its second 
derivative. From (2.2.3a), the second derivative of   is 
   
   
 
  
  
[
  
  
(
 
   
 
 
   
)  (
 
   
 
 
   
)]     ( ) [
 (
   
 
  ( )) (
   
 
  )
(   )(   )
].  (2.3.5) 
The point of inflection of   are derived by  (
   
 
  ( ))  (
   
 
  )   .  
The concavity of the GNEF varies depending on its parametric variations. Without loss of 
generality, we consider the positive marginal externality function,    . The case     
can be imitated, analogously. In the following, we analyze a few particular cases. 
Case I: In this case, the constant of proportionality of (2.2.3a) equals to the reciprocal of 
the network externality index, (    
   or      ). Under this condition,   in (2.2.3b) 
is reduced to 
 ( )    
   
  (
    
    
)(
    
    
)(
   
   
)
.  (2.3.6) 
Proposition 2.3.2 For       and (   ( ))  (   )  (   ). 
1. If (
    
    
) (
    
    
)   , then for all  ,    ( )    and  ( )   ( ). 
2. If (
    
    
) (
    
    
)   , then for all  ,    ( )    and (   ( )) is below the line  . 
3. If (
    
    
) (
    
    
)   , then for all  ,    ( )    and (   ( )) is above the line  . 
Proof  Let    (
    
    
) (
    
    
), and the equation (2.3.6) can be written as 
 ( )  
(     )(   )    (   )
(     ) (    ) 
.  (2.3.7) 
Let        and simplify the equation (2.3.7) into 
 ( )  
(   )(   )
(   ) (   ) 
 
(   ) 
(   ) (   ) 
 
(   )  
(   ) (   ) 
.  (2.3.8) 
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 ( )   ( )  
  (   )(   ) 
(   ) (   ) 
.  (2.3.9) 
From (2.3.5) and (2.3.9), the second derivative of GNEF can be rewritten as 
   ( )  
    ( )
(   )(   )
 [ ( )   ( )]  
     
 ( ) 
(   ) (   ) 
.  (2.3.10) 
Hence, from (2.3.9) and (2.3.10), 
If     then for all  ,  ( )   ( ) and    ( )   . 
If     then for all  ,  ( )   ( ) and    ( )   . 
If     then for all  ,  ( )   ( ) and    ( )   . 
In this case, the sign of concavity will not change for entire domain; hence the slope of 
GNEF is also monotonic. See Figure 2.3a. 
Remark 2.3.4 (
    
    
) (
    
    
)    is equivalent to 
    
    
 
    
    
 which means the initial 
excess network externality per used market share equals to the initial deficit network 
externality per unused market share. 
Case II: In this case (     ), for       and      , the GNEF has S and N 
shaped graphs, respectively. See Figure 2.3b. 
  
(a) (b) 
 
Figure 2.3 Sketches of the shape of GNEF, illustrating the role of   . (a)       
              (hence  
       )                            , and (b) 
                   ,                                . 
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Based on Table 2.1, there are three assumptions about the shape of network externality 
function, namely linear, concave and convex functions. The GNEF’s shape is adjustable 
to fit all these assumptions. Hence, we can say that each assumption is a special case of 
GNEF, see Figure 2.3a. Moreover, the GNEF is able to provide a monotonic S-shape and 
N-shape function, see Figure 2.3b. 
Example 2.3.1 The example of an N-shaped network externality function is the product 
that develops itself when the network size reaches a certain level. The smartphones, for 
example, has few applications in the early in which diminishing concept in marginal 
network externality is applied. Later, when network size increases, there are more 
developers creating many new applications. At this point, the marginal network 
externality is no longer diminishing, but exponentially increasing. 
 
2.4 Applications: Planning, Policy and Performance 
In this section, we analyze the effects due to parametric variations on the network 
externality process and its value. The presented results provide a glimpse of the role and 
scope of parametric variations as control mechanisms/strategies for the planning, policy 
and performance regarding network goods/services/information/labor/entity. 
2.4.1 From the properties of   described in Section 2.3, it is obvious that the dynamic 
models (2.2.3a) and (2.2.3c) of network externality process fulfill all the existing 
assumptions used in the literature, Gottinger (2003), Lin (2008), Ben-Zion and 
Tavor(2006). 
2.4.2 The mathematical description of network externality process provides the 
foundation and the basis for the parametric sensitivity analysis of GNEF. The dynamic 
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nature of the network externality process provides the parametric dependence. The 
underlying parameters can be characterized and decomposed into different classes of 
parameters depending on the planning, policy and performance of the network externality 
goods/entity. In short, the domain of parameters can be decomposed into sub-domains 
regarding the planning, policy and performance strategies. 
2.4.3 The policy makers are the persons who set the plans pursed by the firm or 
government objectives. The developed plans depend on the estimator’s estimates from 
the model. The firm managers have the common objective to have high network 
externality value or high market share. From the discussion 2.3.2 and the switching cost 
in Section 2.3, the parameter “ ” (lower limit of network externality) is a “planning 
parameter”. For     and      , when parameter “ ” increases, while keeping the 
other parameters constant, the network externality value increases for lower market share 
and decreases for the higher market share. Similar interpretation can be given for the 
other parameters,     and  . See Table 2.2, 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5. 
2.4.4 From Proposition 2.3.2, and its condition,      
   
   
   indicates the shape of 
GNEF. Hence, the relationship between the class of parameters         and   creates the 
region of parameters that have the equivalent shape. See Figure 2.4a-f. 
For    , 
 If      , then the shape of GNEF is shown as Figure 2.3a; 
 If      , then the GNEF has S-shape shown as Figure 2.3b; 
 If      , then the GNEF has N-shape shown in Figure 2.3b. 
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Hence, the policy makers can employ these regions to justify the shape of GNEF as they 
want. Effects of these parameters can be utilized by the policy makers to manage the 
network goods. The policies are based on the ultimate goal(s) of firm/government. 
2.4.5 From Section 2.3, we showed that parameters             represent the boundary 
parameters of GNEF, parameter   represents its shape, and parameters       represent its 
location. The policy makers of a firm can control certain parameters on the basis of the 
suitable policies to accomplish their objectives. If the policy makers can control    and  , 
they can control the rate of change at initial point 
  
  
|
    
. For the point (     ) under 
reference line, the higher    the higher rate of change. For the point (     )  above 
reference line, the lower    the higher rate of change. That is, the policy maker can 
project firm’s growth by adjusting the initial market share. For the small firm, the lower 
initial market share has higher growth rate. For the large firm, the higher initial market 
share has higher growth rate. For more graphic representations, see Table 2.6 . 
2.4.6 From the sign of  , we have either network externality function increasing or 
decreasing. However, this phenomenon can be interrupted by incorporating the discrete 
time intervention process (Ladde (2005), Korzeniowski and Ladde (2010)). In the 
modeling of network externality process, this intervention idea is indeed motivated by the 
overall policy of network/users or provider. In fact, the idea of intervention maintains 
competitive/cooperative behavior of the comparable network goods. This indeed avoids 
monopoly of a market of network goods/service/information. Currently, this work is at 
the planning stage. 
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Table 2.2 Effect of a parameter “ ” to the GNEF’s shape at various   when         
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Table 2.3 Effect of a parameter “ ” to the GNEF’s shape at various   when         
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Table 2.4 Effect of a parameter “ ” to the GNEF’s shape at various   when         
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Table 2.5 Effect of a parameter “ ” to the GNEF’s shape at various   when         
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Table 2.6 Effect of the initial parameter    to the GNEF’s shape at various   when 
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(a) “ ” parameter (b) “ ” parameter 
 
 
(c) “ ” parameter (d) “ ” parameter 
 
 
(e) “   ” parameter (f) “   ” parameter 
 
Figure 2.4 The control region of various parameters 
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2.5 Conclusions 
2.5.1 After careful review and evaluation of the network externality literature, we 
formally developed several ideas, notably, network externality process and network 
goods. By using these ideas, we formulated the Principle of Network Externality. The 
introduced principle provides a quantitative description of the concept of network 
externality as the dynamic process with respect to a market share/size. 
2.5.2 The presented dynamic description of network externality process provides a 
systematic way of analyzing its well-known and well recognized properties in a unified 
way. In fact, it provides a sufficient condition to validate existing assumptions in the 
literature, Gottinger (2003), Lin (2008), Ben-Zion and Tavor (2006). This extends the 
existing ideas in a unified and coherent manner. 
2.5.3 In general, the network externality is considered to have positive marginal network 
externality; however, we have shown that for some types of network 
goods/needs/deficiencies/labor/education, the network externality has negative effects. 
For example the users of rare item market will lost their specialty, when the market size 
increases. In short, the marginal of network externality function is not only positive but 
also can be negative, depending on types of network goods. 
2.5.4 The most significant contribution of the network externality process is that it 
provides the sufficient conditions for the existing assumptions regarding the network 
externality function. Moreover, conditions depend on the parameters, this parameter 
dependence of model provides mechanism to make the policy to meet performance goal 
of the network goods.  
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CHAPTER 3  
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF 
GENERALIZED NETWORK EXTERNALITY FUNCTION 
 
In this chapter, we utilize the generalized network externality function (GNEF) in 
Chapter 2 to the real world data. We define the two normalized concepts. We use 
statistical techniques to estimate the parameters in GNEF of banking asset model. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In the following, we provide an empirical study to illustrate the usefulness of GNEF. 
Unfortunately, we are unable to find an explicit data set with regard to a market share of a 
good and its externality value. But in the search of a data set, We were able to find two 
types of banking data sets from the central bank of the United States of America (the 
Federal Reserve or simply "the Fed") (http://www.federalreserve.gov/default.htm). 
Moreover, the data sets are with respect to the weekly banking deposit and asset of the 
commercial banks in the USA from the January 2008 to January 2010. The sketches of 
the raw data sets suggest that both data sets have Sigmoid shape curve representation. 
Figure 3.1a and Figure 3.1b are the US weekly banking asset and deposit (US dollar 
billion), from Jan 2008 – Jan 2010, respectively. The individual data is modeled in 
Section 3.2. The US banking deposit treated as the market share by normalization is 
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discussed in Section 3.3. The GNEF for two banking data sets are developed in Section 
3.4. 
  
(a) (b) 
 
Figure 3.1 Plot of Weekly US banking (a) asset and (b) deposit ($US billion) from 
January 2008 through January 2010. 
 
 
3.2 Statistical Modeling of US Banking Asset and Deposit 
In this section, the statistical studies of the given data sets are summarized. Moreover, by 
utilizing the statistical results, we briefly outline the dynamic modeling and parameter 
estimation of both data sets. From Figure 3.1, we can use the Sigmoid function to fit 
them. The brief discussion is as follow. Let 
   US Banking Asset    US Banking Deposit. (3.2.1) 
From the plots in Figures 3.1, we conclude that the US banking asset and deposit data 
sets possess the following deterministic dynamic models: 
     (    )(    )  , (3.2.2) 
and 
     (    )(    ) t, (3.2.3) 
respectively, where for          ,       and    are positive parameters. 
Moreover, the solutions corresponding to (3.2.2) and (3.2.3) are 
 35 
 (       )     
     
       
(     ) 
  (3.2.4) 
and 
 (       )     
     
       
(     ) 
,  (3.2.5) 
where    (
     
     
)     (     )   and    (
     
     
)     (     )  . 
We apply the Newton-Rahpson Method (Seber and Wild (1989)) to estimate the 
parameters          and    for           in (3.2.4) and (3.2.5). The statistical summary 
is outlined in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 Estimated parameters of US banking asset and deposit model 
 
Dynamic Model 
US Banking 
Asset Model 
US Banking 
Deposit Model 
Lower Limit:  
(Standard Error) 
11.0036 
(1.48x10
-2
) 
11.4909 
(1.75x10
-2
) 
Upper Limit:  
(Standard Error) 
12.0311 
(1.00x10
-2
) 
13.2204 
(1.41x10
-2
) 
Location Parameter:   
(Standard Error) 
2.607x10
-4
 
(1.75x10
-4
) 
0.0045 
(1.11x10
-3
) 
Constant of Proportionality:   
(Standard Error) 
0.2067 
(1.87x10
-2
) 
0.0664 
(3.68x10
-3
) 
Residual Sum of 
Square: RSS 
0.4882 0.4938 
Coefficient of 
Determination::    
0.9773 0.9906 
 
Remark 3.2.1 The results of the data fitting in Table 3.1 includes four parameters, their 
standard deviations in parenthesis, residual sum of square     ∑ (     ̂)
 
  and 
coefficient of determination      
∑ (     ̂)
 
 
∑ (    ̅)
 
 
 are also included. Both models have 
very low RSS (about zero) and high    (about one). The variation of US banking asset 
and US banking deposit can be explained by Sigmoid function 97.73% and 99.06%, 
respectively. We note that the standard errors in parenthesis corresponding to parameters 
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are recorded in Table 3.1. The Residual standard error (RSE) for the US Banking asset 
model is 0.0695 with 101 degrees of freedom. It needs 18 iterations for the convergence. 
In the case of US banking deposit model, the residual standard error (RSE) is 0.0699 with 
101 degrees of freedom. It needs 14 iterations to establish the convergence. 
Remark 3.2.2 By observing the qualitative nature of the above cited data sets, we 
construct the data sets, and introduce various types of normalized US banking deposit 
models. The developed models will be utilized to introduce the US banking asset as 
network externality for the banking industry. 
  
(a) (b) 
 
Figure 3.2 Curve fitting of the US banking (a) asset and (b) deposit 
 
 
3.3 Normalized US Banking Deposit Models 
To justify the usage of the US banking asset and deposit as the network externality and 
financial market share, respectively, we need to analyze the asset as the network 
externality value and the banking deposit as the market share. Because the domain of   
in (3.2.3) is between zero and one,    (   ), we need to modify the data values of US 
banking deposit model (USBD Model) and develop normalized banking deposit models. 
In particular, we need an upper limit for banking deposit. In the absence of a prior 
knowledge of absolute least upper bound of US banking deposit, we am forced to 
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normalize the given data set and also need to develop the dynamic model for normalized 
US banking deposit. As a result of this, based on different normalized banking deposit 
procedure, we have developed two models. 
3.3.1 Normalized US Banking Deposit Model (USBD Model) – I 
We normalize the scale of banking deposit   to have the lower and upper limits. We 
define the excess US banking deposit as the difference between the current US banking 
deposit   and its lower limit, that is,     . A theoretical overall excess US banking 
deposit is defined as the difference between the upper and lower limit of banking deposit, 
that is      . Thus, the normalized banking deposit is defined by: 
    
    
     
 or   (     )      . (3.3.1) 
After the normalization of banking deposit, the dynamic equation (3.2.3) is reduced to: 
       (     )   (     )  . (3.3.2) 
Its solution is, 
   (          )    
 
       
(     ) 
. (3.3.3) 
where    (
     
       
)     (     )     . Now in the dynamic equation in (3.3.2), its 
upper limit is one and lower limit is zero. Theoretically, the normalized banking deposit 
    must be between zero and one. Unfortunately, the parameters    and    are 
unknown. Therefore, we use the estimators  ̂  and  ̂  of US banking deposit model from 
Table 3.1 in (3.3.1). 
Remark 3.3.1 The presented normalization process in (3.3.1) lost some data points. This 
is due to the fact that, we used the estimators  ̂  and  ̂  instead of the true parameters. In 
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order to minimize the loss of data points, we introduce another normalization method to 
obtain the concept of market share. This is described below. 
3.3.2 Normalized US Banking Deposit Model (USBD Model) – II 
In view of Remark 3.3.1, we consider the banking deposit as a part of portfolio, and then 
we calculate the transform data set by comparing the banking deposit to the US average 
gross investment (USAGI). The US average gross investment from January 2008 through 
January 2010 is 18.82 billion US dollars (http://www.federalreserve.gov/default.htm). 
We assume that USAGI is upper limit for the US banking deposit. Under this assumption, 
we define the following transformation to normalize the US banking deposit as follow: 
    
 
     
. (3.3.4) 
Now, by following the argument used in the US banking deposit model (USBD Model) – 
I, we have the dynamic model for the normalized US banking deposit model as: 
            (    
  
     
) (
  
     
    )   . (3.3.5) 
Its solution is, 
   (        )    
 
        
, (3.3.6) 
where    (
      
  
     
  
     
      
)         (
  
     
 
  
     
)     . Now in the dynamic equation in 
(3.3.5), its upper limit is 
  
     
 and lower limit is 
  
     
.  
 
3.4 US Banking Asset Network Externality Models 
By employing our knowledge in the theory of relative growth, J. Huxley (1932) and 
Robert Rosen (1967) and following the definition of network externality, we define the 
relative growth of the US banking asset,  , with respect to the normalized US banking 
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deposit. Thus, we conclude that the US banking asset can be considered as a function of 
US banking deposit. This idea naturally illustrates that the US banking asset as network 
externality process with respect to the banking deposit as a financial market share. As the 
result of this, we utilize two normalized USBD models to develop corresponding 
dynamic models for the US banking asset as the network externality process. Therefore, 
we have two dynamic models for the network externality for the US banking asset. 
From the Deterministic US banking asset model in Section 3.2, the relative growth model 
of   in (3.2.2) with respect to two normalized US banking deposit models described by 
(3.3.1)-(3.3.2) and (3.3.4)-(3.3.5) are as follow: 
   
  
  (     )
(    )(    )
   (     )
    , (3.4.1a) 
   
  
       
(    )(    )
(    
  
     
)(
  
     
    )
    , (3.4.1b) 
respectively, where                and    are as defined before. These two dynamic 
models are dynamic models of network externality of the US banking asset with respect 
to the normalized US banking deposit as the financial market share. These differential 
equations are exactly similar to the differential in (2.2.3b). Therefore, the comparison of 
parameters in (2.2.3b) with parameters in (3.4.1a-b) is as follow: 
                  and   
  
  (     )
, (3.4.2a) 
            
  
     
   
  
     
 and   
  
       
, (3.4.2b) 
respectively. Thus, all parameters above can be estimate by the product of Table 3.1 and 
the plots are shown in Figure 3.3. 
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(a) (b) 
 
Figure 3.3 Curve fitting of USBANE: indirect approach (a) Model-I (b) Model-II 
 
The summary estimation of two US banking asset network externality models (USBANE 
Model) is based on the estimated parameters in Table 3.1 in the contest of the parameters 
of normalized USBD models as the financial market share. 
Table 3.2 Estimated parameters of USBANE Models with USBD Market Share 
 
USBANE Model I Model II 
Lower Limit:  11.0036 11.0036 
Upper Limit:  12.0311 12.0311 
Minimum Share:   0 0.6106 
Maximum Share :   1 0.7025 
Constant of Proportionality:   0.1857 0.0171 
Sample Size 85 105 
Residual Sum of 
Square: RSS 
0.6242 0.4537 
 
3.5 Model Diagnostics 
The underlying nonlinear regression model (Ritz and Streibig, 2008) are: 
1. Correct mean function 
2. Variance homogeneity (homoscedasticity) 
3. Normally distribution measurement errors 
4. Mutually independent measurement errors 
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Violation of any one of the above assumptions could result in bias estimators and/or 
distort standard errors. In this subsection, we examine model diagnostic of nonlinear least 
square analysis of US banking asset and deposit models, (3.2.4) and (3.2.5), respectively. 
This is essential to analyze their behaviors of the residual error independency, 
homogeneity and normality under the application of Newton-Raphson method. We 
consider some important plots, homogeneity test and normality test.  
  
(a) (b) 
 
Figure 3.4 Plot of residuals vs time of (a) asset, and (b) deposit models 
 
Figure 3.4 show the residuals plot of asset and deposit models. Thus, we conclude that 
their residuals are homoscedasticity with respect to time. 
  
(a) (b) 
 
Figure 3.5 Plot of standardized residuals vs fitted value of (a) asset, and (b) deposit 
models 
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Figure 3.5 exhibit the plot of standardized residuals vs the fitted values of asset and 
deposit models. These standardized residual error plots demonstrate that there is no linear 
correlation. This suggests that the residual errors exhibit the homogeneity. This assertion 
will be further examined by the application of statistical test for homogeneity as 
described below. 
Homogeneity Test: From residual plots, one can easily draw a conclusion about the 
homogeneity of residual errors. However, we apply the homogeneity test developed by 
Endrenyi and Kwong (1981) to our residual errors of asset and deposit models. The brief 
description of the test is as follow: First, we ﬁt the model, and then order the residuals as 
 ̂( )  ̂( )    ̂( ). Secondly, we compute the ratio of the last   squared residuals to the 
ﬁrst   squared residuals. The suggestion for   is   
   
 
. Under these considerations, the 
homogeneity test is as follow:  
      (  )   
  vs       (  )   
  
  
∑  ̂( )
  
       
∑  ̂( )
  
   
          
The   statistics and its          of the test are recorded in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3 Homogeneity test:   statistics and p-values 
 
Homogeneity test Asset Model Deposit Model 
  0.7459 1.0100 
         0.2256 0.5102 
 
From the Table 3.3, the          of two models are bigger than       . This shows 
that there is no signiﬁcant evidence to reject the homogeneity of their residuals at the 
signiﬁcance level 0.05.  
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(a) (b) 
 
Figure 3.6 QQ Plot of standardized residuals of (a) asset, and (b) deposit model 
 
Figure 3.6 show the QQ plots of the standardized residual errors of asset and deposit 
models. There is slightly different from straight line. We need further examine the 
normality of standardized residual errors by utilizing the histogram. The results are as 
follow. 
  
(a) (b) 
 
Figure 3.7 Histogram of standardized residuals of (a) asset, and (b) deposit model 
 
Figure 3.7 exhibit that histogram of the standardized residual errors of deposit model is 
more normal shape than asset model. In addition to this, we utilize the statistical 
normality test developed by Shapiro and Wilk (2008) and this test is as described below. 
Normality Test: For this test, the null and alternative hypotheses are: 
    The random sample,           , is drawn from normally distributed population 
    The random sample,           , is not drawn from normally distributed population 
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We compute   
∑    ( )
 
   
∑ ( ( )  ̅)
  
   
   where  ( )  is order statistic,  ̅  is the sample mean. 
(       )  
     
(         )
 
 
, where  (       )
  
        are the expected values of the order statistics of independent and identically 
distributed random variables sample from the standard normal distribution and   is the 
covariance matrix of those order statistics. 
The  statistics and its          of the test are recorded in Table 3.4 
Table 3.4 Normality test:  statistics and p-values 
 
Normality Test Asset Model Deposit Model 
  0.9783 0.9814 
         0.0819 0.1489 
 
From the Table 3.4, their          are bigger than       . This suggests that there 
is no signiﬁcant evidence to reject the normality of their residuals at the signiﬁcance level 
0.05. In summary, from the above statistical study, we conclude that the residuals exhibit 
independency, homogeneity and normality of Asset and Deposit models.  
 
3.6 Conclusions 
We utilize the generalized network externality function (GNEF) in Chapter 2 to the real 
world data set. In the banking industry, we consider the banking asset as the network 
externality value and banking deposit as the market share. The data sets are with respect 
to the weekly banking deposit and asset of the commercial banks in the USA from the 
January 2008 to January 2010. There are two methods to treat banking deposit as market 
share, marking the minimum/maximum share and portfolio methods. From the sketches 
of banking asset and deposit, it suggests that both data sets have Sigmoid shape curve. 
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Then their relative growth is the same as (2.2.3a) in Chapter 2 which leads to GNEF 
(2.2.3b). Consequently, there are also two US banking asset network externality models. 
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CHAPTER 4  
ADAPTIVE EXPECTATION FOR NETWORK GOODS 
 
In this chapter, we consider a utility function that is influenced by the value of network 
externality function at the consumer’s expected market size/share. Using this utility 
function, a market share adjustment function is introduced and is utilized to develop 
dynamic models of existing rational and static expectation processes. In addition, the role 
and scope of dynamic models of market share adjustment process are extended to the 
well-known adaptive expectation and its extension processes. The properties of 
equilibrium states of dynamic models are investigated which include location, stability, 
oscillation and the initial states in systematic and unified way. The most significant 
byproduct of presented results is that the properties of equilibrium states depend on the 
type of consumer expectation of a network good and the parameters of dynamic market 
share adjustment processes. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
With regard to network goods, the utility function is known to be affected by the market 
size/share (Shy, 2001). The fundamental concept of network externality is that consumers 
gain more benefit when more consumers consume the same good. Hence, the market 
size/share is a factor that affects the consumer’s decision to adopt a network good. In 
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practice, consumers do not have information about the actual market size/share. In view 
of this, consumers need to speculate their expected market size/share.  
It is well-known (Katz and Shapiro, 1985) that in the network goods economy, the idea of 
dependence of consumer surplus function on the value of network externality function at 
the consumer’s expected market size/share was introduced. Moreover, under the fulfilled 
expectation assumption, the rational equilibrium is characterized for compatible products. 
Katz and Shapiro (1985) ideas and results are extended by Easley and Kleinberg (2010) 
to consumer demand goods and Amir and Lazzati (2011) to industry performance. 
Furthermore, under the rational expectation assumption, the effects of the market 
structure of the equilibrium states are analyzed. 
In this work, we extend the idea of Katz and Shapiro (1985) to modify the utility function 
that depends on a value of network externality function at an expected market size/share 
at a real time  . The consumer’s expected market size/share is speculated, and it is based 
on either the current or the past market share, or the combination of the current and past 
market share. Instead of directly using properties of modified utility function, we utilize 
the modified function to introduce a concept of market share adjustment function. 
Employing the market share adjustment function, we develop mathematical models 
corresponding to consumer rational, static, and current and lagged adaptive expectations 
in a systematic and unified way. Furthermore, we establish the existence and location of 
equilibrium states and study the qualitative properties of equilibrium states in a 
systematic way. The qualitative properties (stability and oscillation) are analyzed in the 
context of the parameters of dynamic systems. In fact, the parameters of the dynamic 
systems are decomposed into subsets that are characterized by the stability and oscillatory 
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regions. Moreover, the presented dynamic model formation provides a suitable design to 
develop an agent-based simulation model (Paothong, 2013). 
In short, the chapter is organized as follows. By introducing a market share adjustment 
function, dynamic models for rational and static expectation processes are developed in 
Section 4.2. In addition, sufficient conditions are given to exhibit the existence of 
corresponding rational and static equilibrium states. In Section 4.3, by considering a 
market share adjustment function in the context of adaptive expectations, dynamic 
models of current and lagged adaptive expectation processes are developed. Furthermore, 
it is shown the static equilibrium states are invariant under the current and lagged 
adaptive expectation processes. In Section 4.4, the sufficient conditions are given to 
establish the qualitative properties (stability and oscillatory) of dynamic systems. We 
note that the stability conditions are in terms of parameters of dynamic systems. In 
Section 4.5, by extending the domain of the speed of adjustment parameter, we develop 
the results parallel to the results of Section 4.4. Moreover, we decompose the domain of 
dynamic systems and the speed of adjustment parameters into regions according to 
qualitative properties of dynamic systems. In Section 4.6, by using simulations, we 
exhibit the influence of the initial states on the solution paths of dynamic models under 
static, current and lagged adaptive expectation processes. 
 
4.2 Dynamic Models of Rational and Static Expectation Processes 
We analyze an underlying network good model in discrete time,   {       }, and all 
variables are time varying or time invariant. For each  , a utility function is composed of 
the consumer’s individual preference, the price of the network good and the value of 
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network externality function at a consumer’s expected market size/share. In this study, 
for simplicity, we treat the market size as the market share,    , that is, it has value 
between zero and one,    [   ]. Hence, 
 (    
  )     (  
  )   (4.2.1) 
where   is the consumer’s individual preference;   
  is the consumer’s expected market 
share at time  ;   is the price of the network good and   is the generalized network 
externality function (GNEF) (Paothong and Ladde, 2012). We further make two 
assumptions: 
1. The individual preference   is distributed according to a cumulative distribution 
function,   (cdf) with a probability density function,   (pdf). 
2. Each consumer has an identical expectation type and network externality 
function. 
Following the argument used by Katz and Shapiro (1985), we conclude that the consumer 
joins the network whenever his/her utility is greater than zero, that is,    (  )    
 ; otherwise he/she stays out of the network market. Let    be the individual preference 
level at which the consumer is indifferent between joining and staying out of the network 
market, that is,     (  )   . This interpretation motivates us to introduce a concept 
of a market share adjustment function. It is defined by 
   ∫  ( )  
 
 
    ( )     (   (  
  ))   (  
 )  (4.2.2) 
where   
 ,  ,   and   are defined in (4.2.1),   and   are defined in assumption 1. 
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(a) (b) 
 
Figure 4.1 Sketches of (a) GNEF and (b) pdf of consumer’s individual preference. 
 
Remark 4.2.1 We observe that the market share is illustrated by the shaded area under   
in Figure 4.1b. The function   [   ]  [   ] in (4.2.2) is continuous. Since   and   are 
pdf and network externality functions, respectively, the first derivative of the function   
is 
  (  )   ( )  (  )    (4.2.3) 
Thus, the function   is increasing on [   ]. Moreover, from (4.2.2), the mathematical 
description of an equilibrium state of network market share at a time   is determined by 
  
   (  
 ). Clearly, the existence of the equilibrium states is determined by the solution 
of the algebraic equation (4.2.2). 
Proposition 4.2.1  (  )    , if and only if      
 . 
Proof From (4.2.2), and the increasing property of  , for  (  )    , we have 
 ( (  
 ))   (  
 )  
This implies that 
 (  
 )       
   
This completes the proof of “if” part. The proof of the “only if” part follows by imitating 
the argument in the reverse order. 
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Proposition 4.2.2 If       (  )          ( ), then the function   defined in 
(4.2.2) has a fixed point,  ̅   ( ̅). 
Proof. For   [   ] and the increasing property of functions   and  , we have 
 (      (  )   ( ))   (   ( ))   (      (  )   ( )) 
 (    )   ( )   (    ), 
and 
   ( )   . 
Since   and   are continuous functions,   is a real-valued continuous function defined on 
the interval [   ]. Define  ( )   ( )   . Then,   is also continuous function with 
 ( )    and  ( )   . Therefore, by application of Theorem 1.6.1 of Ladde et al 
(1985), there exists  ̅ (   ) such that  ( ̅)   . Hence,  ̅   ( ̅). 
Remark 4.2.2 From the economists’ view, a straight forward interpretation of 
Proposition 4.2.2 is as follows. If the price satisfies the condition,         (  ), then 
all consumers join the network with their expected market share, and hence,   
    for 
all     , that is,  ̅   ( ̅)   . On the other hand, if the price satisfies the condition, 
        (  ) , then all consumers leave the network with their expected market 
share, and hence,   
    for all     , that is,  ̅   ( ̅)   . 
We note that the properties of equilibrium states are affected by the nature of the function 
  and the type of consumer expectation. In the following subsections, we outline two 
well-known expectations for a network good. 
4.2.1 Rational Expectation (RE) 
The rational expectation is defined as the optimal forecast. All consumers use all 
available information to form their expectations. We remark that RE was originally 
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introduced by John F. Muth (1961). Also, in a network good, Katz and Shapiro (1985) 
used RE in their work, and the equilibrium state is called the fulfilled expectation 
equilibrium. In this scenario, all consumers have perfect foresight about the market share, 
  
    . Consequently, from (4.2.2), a dynamic model of RE process satisfies the 
following discrete time dynamic iterative adjustment process, 
    (  ), for      (4.2.4) 
In this case, the equilibrium state(s) is(are) the point(s) of intersection(s) of function   
and the line with slope of one. It is well-known in the fixed-point theory that the 
solution(s) of (4.2.4) is(are) called the fixed point(s) of the function  . Obviously, the 
existence of fixed points of   depends on its analytic properties (Proposition 4.2.2). 
When consumers have a RE for a network good, the multiple fixed points are commonly 
discussed. Furthermore, the discussion of these equilibrium states can be found in Amir 
and Lazzati (2011), Easley and Kleinberg (2010) and Katz and Shapiro (1985). In 
general, there are two disadvantages for the RE scenario. First, it is a very restrictive 
assumption on the consumer expectation. It implies that all consumers have perfect 
information about market equilibrium. Second, it is an instantaneous adjustment process. 
Therefore, it is a completely static process. The equilibrium states of RE process depend 
on the parametric variation in algebraic equation (4.2.4) (Proposition 4.2.2). 
Illustration 4.2.1 Let us consider a particular example in which          (   ), and 
  is a generalized network externality function in Chapter 2 (Paothong and Ladde, 2012) 
with                    
 
 
      and    , that is,  (   )  
   
 
         
 . 
We observe that       ,       ,  ( )    and  ( )   . In this simple case, 
 (  )    
 
 
 
 (  )
 
. From Proposition 4.2.2, the appropriate price range is      . 
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For this concrete example, if      , there are three equilibrium states at  ̅  
        ̅         and  ̅        . We note that   ( ̅ )          ,   ( ̅ )  
         and   ( ̅ )          .  ̅  and  ̅  are lower and upper stable states, 
respectively, but  ̅  is unstable. For        and       , there corresponds one 
stable equilibrium state at  ̅         and  ̅        , respectively. This suggests that 
the price level affects the location and number of equilibrium states. Moreover, as the 
price increases, the function   moves downward, 
  
  
  
 
 
  , 
  
  
   (   (  ))  
 . See Figure 4.2. 
   
(a) (b) (c) 
 
Figure 4.2 Sketches of (a) GNEF,  (   )  
   
 
         
 ; (b) pdf of the consumer’s 
individual preference          (   ), (c) function  , and location(s) of equilibrium 
states that are determined by price = 2.25, 2.5 and 2.75 for Illustration 4.2.1. 
 
4.2.2 Static Expectation 
To study the adjustment process in the neighborhood of the equilibrium state, the 
simplest common type of consumer expectation, namely static (or naive) expectation, is 
employed. Consumers have asymmetric information in time, and they expect no change 
for the present time. In this case, all consumers use the immediate past actual market 
share as their present expectation,   
      . Consequently, from (4.2.2), a dynamic 
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model of SE process is determined by the first order nonlinear difference equation that 
describes a dynamic model of the market share adjustment process, 
      (  ),  (  )     (4.2.5) 
In this case, the sequence {  }    
  is a solution path of discrete time dynamic adjustment 
process (4.2.5), where     (        ). The equilibrium states (steady states:  ( ̅)   ̅) 
of (4.2.5) are determined by Proposition 4.2.2. The assumption of a single unit time lag is 
realistic, and is suitable to derive an empirically tractable strategy to identify the 
adjustment process for the equilibrium sates. 
Illustration 4.2.2 We illustrate the stability conditions of an equilibrium state by the 
graphical method. Suppose    is the initial market share. For   in (4.2.5), clearly, 
    (  ),     (  )  and so on. In this method, we track the initial state (     ) and 
move vertically until we reach the curve to  (  )    , then move horizontally until we 
reach (     ) and so on until we reach the equilibrium state  ̅. See Figure 4.3a. Using 
the Illustration 4.2.1, the graphical method tells us that the adjustment process will 
converge to two stable equilibrium states for which   ( ̅)   ; and diverge from an 
unstable equilibrium state for which   ( ̅)   . Since,   ( ̅ )          ,   ( ̅ )  
         and   ( ̅ )          ,  ̅  and  ̅  are the lower and upper stable 
equilibrium states, respectively, but  ̅  is unstable equilibrium state. The detailed 
analytic stability conditions will be discussed in Section 4.4. See Figure 4.3b. 
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(a) (b) 
 
Figure 4.3 (a) Adjustment process of stable equilibrium state: graphical method; and (b) 
shows three equilibrium states, two stable and one unstable. 
 
Remark 4.2.3 If all consumers follow the SE process with   
   ̅, then the market share 
adjustment function has a fixed point at  ̅. Hence, the solution of (4.2.4) is the long run 
solution of equation (4.2.5). Moreover, since   is an increasing function (Paothong and 
Ladde, 2012), from (4.2.3),   is also an increasing function. Thus, there is no chaotic 
situation for this model (Chiarella, 1988). 
 
4.3 Dynamic Models of Adaptive Expectation Processes 
In this section, we utilize the well-known adaptive expectation (AE) to form a consumer 
expectation of market share. The AE is one of the backward-looking expectations. More 
precisely, the future (present) expectation of an endogenous variable is directly adjusted 
by the weighted mean of its current (immediate past) actual value and either the current 
or the past expected value. Thus, in this study, we classify the AE into two simple 
categories. 
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4.3.1 Current Adaptive Expectation (CAE) 
In this traditional adaptive expectation (Chow, 2011) all consumers speculate the future 
(present) market share by the weighted sum of the current (immediate past) expectation 
and the current (immediate past) actual market share, that is, 
    
  (   )  
      [  
  (   )    
       ], (4.3.1) 
where       is a speed of adjustment in which SE process is a special case of CAE 
process (   ). The “ω” measures the significance of   
  and   . If    , then the 
consumer is very conservative. From (4.3.1) and (4.2.2), a dynamic model of CAE 
process is described by the following first order nonlinear difference equation, 
     (   )     (  )   (  ),  (  )    . (4.3.2) 
Of course, by following the argument used in the SE process, the existences of 
equilibrium states are determined by (4.3.2). 
Proposition 4.3.1 From the dynamic model (4.3.2) of the CAE process, we have 
a)   and   have the same equilibrium states; 
b)  ( )    is scalar multiple of  ( )   ; 
c) If   is parallel to the line with slope one, then   is parallel to  ; 
d) If the speed of adjustment decreases (increase),   is rotated clockwise (anti-
clockwise) toward the line around equilibrium states. 
Proof of (a): The equilibrium states of dynamic CAE process are determined by  ( ̅)  
 ̅ . This implies  ̅  (   ) ̅    ( ̅) . Hence,  ( ̅)   ̅ . Conversely,  ( ̅)   ̅ 
implies  ( ̅)   ̅. Thus,  ( ̅)   ̅ if and only if  ( ̅)   ̅. This establishes the validity 
of statement (a). 
Proof of (b): From the definition of  ( ), we have, 
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 ( )     [ ( )   ] (4.3.3) 
This establishes the statement (b), that is,  ( )    is a scalar multiple of  ( )   .  
Proof of (c): From (4.3.3), and applying the concept of implicit differentiation, we get  
      (    ) (4.3.4) 
Hence,          . 
Proof of (d): From (4.3.4) we have,  
   
  
     . Hence, if     , then   is rotated 
clockwise around equilibrium state whenever   decreases. On the other hand, if     , 
then   is rotated counterclockwise around equilibrium state whenever   decreases. Thus, 
  squeezes toward 45 degree line around equilibrium states whenever   decreases. 
Remark 4.3.1 The weighted sum of CAE process (4.3.1) and its dynamic model (4.3.2) 
can be modified to 
    
     
  (   )   [  
       
  (   )    ]  
and 
         (   ) (  )   (  ),  (  )    ,  
respectively. The comments and Proposition 4.3.1 remain valid with regard to this 
modified CAE process. 
4.3.2 Lagged Adaptive Expectation (LAE) 
We modify an assumption of the CAE. Here, all consumers use the weighted sum of the 
current expected market share and the immediate past actual market share to adjust their 
immediate future market share as 
    
  (   )  
        [  
  (   )    
       ], (4.3.5) 
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where   is the speed of adjustment defined in (4.3.1). Hence, the dynamic of adjustment 
process in the context of (4.2.2) and (4.3.5) is described by the second order nonlinear 
difference equation as 
     (   )     (    )   (       ),  (  )    . (4.3.6) 
Remark 4.3.2 The weighted sum of LAE process (4.3.5) and its dynamic model (4.3.6) 
can be modified to 
    
     
  (   )     [  
       
  (   )    ]  
and 
         (   ) (    )   (       ),  (  )    ,  
respectively. 
Remark 4.3.3 We observe that the equilibrium states of LAE process are the same as 
CAE, SE and RE processes,  ̅   ( ̅). In other words, the existence of equilibrium states 
is independent of type of consumer expectations. Of course, the existence of equilibrium 
states depends on the distribution of consumer preference random variable, price 
parameter of network good and the network externality function of a network good. 
Table 4.1 Meaning and equilibrium condition of all processes 
 
Process Meaning Equilibrium Condition 
RE     
        ̅   ( ̅) 
SE     
      ̅   ( ̅) 
CAE 
    
  (   )  
      
or 
    
     
  (   )   
 ̅   ( ̅)   ( ̅) 
LAE 
    
  (   )  
        
or 
    
     
  (   )     
 ̅   ( ̅  ̅)   ( ̅) 
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4.4 Stability 
In this section, we study the analytic stability conditions of equilibrium states of four 
types of expectations. For easy reference, we state a few basic definitions of stability 
concepts. 
1. An equilibrium state,  ̅, is called Lyapunov stable or locally uniformly stable 
(LUS), if for any closed enough initial states    to  ̅, then    stays close to  ̅ for 
all time, that is, for each    , there exist  ( )    such that |    ̅|    
|    ̅|    for all     . 
2. A Lyapunov stable equilibrium state is called locally uniformly asymptotically 
stable (LUAS), if for any closed enough initial states    to  ̅, then    converges 
to  ̅, that is, there exist     such that |    ̅|              ̅. 
3. A Lyapunov stable equilibrium state is called globally uniformly stable (GUS), if 
for any initial states   , then    stays close to  ̅ for all time, that is, for each   
 , there exist  ( )    such that |    ̅|    |    ̅|    for all     . 
4. A Lyapunov stable equilibrium state is called globally uniformly asymptotically 
stable (GUAS), if for any initial states   , then    converges to  ̅. That is, for all 
  ,           ̅. 
Now, we are ready to present the stability conditions for each discrete time iterative 
processes with regard to each types of expectation. We recall that the RE process is 
absolutely static. 
4.4.1 Static Expectation (SE) 
The stability of the equilibrium state of SE process depends on the analytic properties of 
  . 
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Proposition 4.4.1 We assume that all consumers have static expectation. Further, we 
assume that the hypothesis of Proposition 4.2.2 is satisfied. Let       [   ] ∫   ( ̅  
 
 
 (   ̅))   and       [   ] ∫   ( ̅   (   ̅))  
 
 
, where  ̅ is the equilibrium state 
of (4.2.5). 
a) If   , then  ̅ is GUAS equilibrium state, 
b) If ∫   ( ̅   (   ̅))  
 
 
  , then  ̅ is GUS equilibrium state, 
c) If   , then  ̅ is unstable equilibrium state. 
Proof of (a): Let  ̅  be an equilibrium state of (4.2.5). For any   [   ]  and the 
generalized mean-value theorem (Ladde et al (1985)), we have 
 ( )   ( ̅)  (   ̅) ∫   ( ̅   (   ̅))  
 
 
. (4.4.1) 
From (4.2.3) and (4.4.1), we have 
| ( )   ( ̅)|   |   ̅| for   [   ]. (4.4.2) 
From Proposition 4.2.2, (4.2.5) and (4.4.2), we have 
|      ̅|   |    ̅| (4.4.3) 
By setting      |      ̅|,     |     ̅|, (4.4.3) is reduced to 
        ,       . (4.4.4) 
For some   , applying the comparison theorem (Ladde and Sambandham, 1985) to 
(4.4.4), we get 
     , (4.4.5) 
where     
    is the solution process of the following comparison iterative process 
        ,       . (4.4.6) 
Thus,  
 61 
|      ̅|   
   |    ̅|, (4.4.7) 
whenever        |    ̅| . From (4.4.7) and the assumption that    , we 
conclude that  ̅ is Lyapunov stable equilibrium state. Moreover,       |    ̅|   , for 
all    [   ]. This exhibits the GUAS property of  ̅. 
Proof of (b): From (4.1), and ∫   ( ̅   (    ̅))  
 
 
  , then |      ̅|  |    ̅|, 
for all  . Hence, |      ̅|  |    ̅|. In view of this, it is obvious that  ̅ is a GUS 
equilibrium state. 
Proof of (c): Imitating the proof of (a), we have 
|      ̅|   
   |    ̅|. (4.4.8) 
Under the condition   , and following the similar argument used in (a), we conclude 
that  ̅ is an unstable equilibrium state. 
Corollary 4.4.1 We assume that all assumptions of Proposition 4.4.1 remain valid, 
except statements (a) and (c) are replaced by: 
a) If   ( ̅)   , then  ̅ is a LUAS equilibrium state, 
b) If   ( ̅)   , then  ̅ is an unstable equilibrium state, 
where   is continuously differentiable at  ̅. 
Proof of (a): Let  ̅  be an equilibrium state of (4.2.5). We suppose that   ( ̅)   . 
Because of the continuity of    at  ̅, there exists an interval   ( ̅     ̅   )    , 
such that   ( )   ( )    for all    . In view of the convexity of an open interval, 
for all    ,   [   ], we have  ̅   (   ̅)   . Hence,   ( ̅   (   ̅))   ( )  
 . From this and (4.4.1), we have 
| ( )   ( ̅)|   ( )|   ̅|, for    .  
Imitating the proof of Proposition 4.4.1(a), we conclude that 
 62 
|      ̅|   ( )
   |    ̅|. (4.4.9) 
From (4.4.9), for each    , one can find  , say      (   ) so that |    ̅|   , 
hence |      ̅|    for all  . In addition,       |      ̅|   . Therefore,  ̅  is a 
LUAS equilibrium state. 
Proof of (b): Let  ̅ be an equilibrium state of (4.2.5). We suppose that   ( ̅)   . Again 
by repeating the reasoning used in the proof of (a), there exists an interval   
( ̅     ̅   )    , such that   ( )   ( )    for all    . Moreover, we have 
| ( )   ( ̅)|   ( )|   ̅|, for    .  
Hence,  
|      ̅|   ( )
   |    ̅|.  
Because  ( )   , then  ̅ is an unstable equilibrium state. 
Remark 4.4.1 From Corollary 4.4.1, the LUAS condition of SE process is 
  ( ̅)    (4.4.10) 
Moreover,   is an increasing function,   ( ̅)   . Thus, the solution    is oscillation-
free. See Figure 4.4a. 
4.4.2 Current Adaptive Expectation (CAE) 
The stability of the equilibrium state of CAE process is parallel to the stability of the 
equilibrium state of the SE process. For the sake of completeness, we formulate the 
results. The detailed proofs can be reconstructed by repeating the arguments used in 
Section 4.4.1. 
Proposition 4.4.2 We assume that all hypotheses of Proposition 4.4.1 remain true. Let 
       [   ] ∫   ( ̅   (   ̅))  
 
 
 and        [   ] ∫   ( ̅   (   ̅))  
 
 
, 
where  ̅ be an equilibrium state of (4.3.2). 
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a) If ((   )    )   , then  ̅ is a GUAS equilibrium state, 
b) If ∫   ( ̅   (   ̅))  
 
 
  , then  ̅ is a GUS equilibrium state, 
c) If ((   )    )   , then  ̅ is an unstable equilibrium state. 
Proof of (a): Let  ̅  be an equilibrium state of (4.3.2). For any   [   ]  and the 
generalized mean-value theorem, we have 
 ( )   ( ̅)  (   ̅) ∫   ( ̅   (   ̅))  
 
 
.  
Hence, 
 ( )   ( ̅)  (   ̅) [(   )   ∫   ( ̅   (   ̅))  
 
 
]. (4.4.11) 
By repeating the argument used in the proof of Proposition 4.4.1, inequalities (4.4.2), 
(4.4.3) and (4.4.7) are reduced to 
| ( )   ( ̅)|  ((   )    )|   ̅|, (4.4.12) 
|      ̅|  [(   )    ]|    ̅|, (4.4.13) 
and 
|      ̅|  ((   )    )
   
|    ̅|, (4.4.14) 
respectively. Moreover, under the assumption, ((   )    )   ,  ̅  is a GUAS 
equilibrium state. 
Proof of (b): The proof of (b) can be reconstructed from the proof of Proposition 
4.4.1(b). 
Proof of (c): Imitating the arguments used in the proofs of (a) and Proposition 4.4.1(c), 
we have 
|      ̅|  ((   )    )
   
|    ̅|. (4.4.15) 
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Thus, from the assumption, ((   )    )   , one concludes that  ̅  is unstable 
equilibrium state. 
In the following, we formulate a result parallel to Corollary 4.4.1. 
Corollary 4.4.2 We assume that all assumptions of Proposition 4.4.2 remain valid, 
except statements (a) and (c) are replaced by: 
a) If ((   )     ( ̅))   , then  ̅ is a LUAS equilibrium state, 
b) If  ((   )     ( ̅))   , then  ̅ is an unstable equilibrium state, 
where   is continuously differentiable at  ̅. 
Proof: The proofs of (a) and (b) can be constructed based on the proofs of Corollary 
4.4.1 and Proposition 4.4.2. The details are omitted.  
Remark 4.4.2 We observe that the conditions ((   )    )   ,     and 
((   )    )   , in Proposition 4.4.2 are equivalent to   ,    and   , 
respectively. Moreover, the conditions ((   )     ( ̅))    and  ((   )  
   ( ̅))    in Corollary 4.4.2 are also equivalent to   ( ̅)    and   ( ̅)   . 
Remark 4.4.3 The stability and instability results with respect to discrete time dynamic 
process described in Remark 4.3.1 can be formulated. In this case, the stability conditions 
(a), (b) and (c) in Proposition 4.4.2 reduce to ((   )   )   ,    and ((  
 )   )   , respectively, where   is defined in Proposition 4.4.2. Moreover, the 
stability and instability conditions of Corollary 4.4.2 become ((   )  ( ̅)   )    
and ((   )  ( ̅)   )   , respectively. A remark similar to Remark 4.4.2 is valid 
with regard to the process described in Remark 4.3.1. 
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4.4.3 Lagged Adaptive Expectation (LAE) 
First, we develop elementary notations and framework to rewrite the second order 
nonlinear difference equation (4.3.6). 
For       [   ] and   [   ]. Let  ̅ be the fixed state of function  in (4.3.6), and let 
us define  
 ( )   ( ̅   (    ̅)  ̅   (    ̅)). 
From this, we have 
  ( )  (   )(    ̅)     ( ̅   (    ̅))(    ̅), 
 (     )   ( ̅  ̅)   ( )   ( )
 (   )(    ̅)   ∫   ( ̅   (    ̅))  
 
 
(    ̅) 
  
Hence, 
 (     )   ̅  (   )(    ̅)    
 ( ̅)(    ̅)
  ∫ [  ( ̅   (    ̅))   
 ( ̅)]  
 
 
(    ̅) 
. (4.4.16) 
Let us define a transformation, 
   [
    
    
]  [
      ̅
    ̅
]. (4.4.17) 
From (4.4.17) and (4.4.18), equation (4.3.6) is rewritten as  
            (    )  , (4.4.18) 
where    [
  
   ( ̅) (   )
],   (    )  [
  
 ∫ [  ( ̅       )   
 ( ̅)]  
 
 
 
] 
We note that    [
  
   ( ̅) (   )
] is a linear operator. Therefore,       , where 
  is the eigenvalue of    for which  
  (   )     ( ̅)   . 
where    
   
 
 √(
   
 
)
 
    ( ̅) and    
   
 
 √(
   
 
)
 
    ( ̅). 
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We note that for      , 
|  |     (4.4.19) 
We present the following Proposition: 
Proposition 4.4.3 Let  ̅ be an equilibrium state of (4.3.6). 
a) From (4.4.19) and if     , then  ̅ is a LUAS equilibrium state, 
b) From (4.4.19) and if |  |   , then  ̅ is an unstable equilibrium state, 
c) If      and        , then the solution process is a damped oscillatory,  
d) If      , then the solution process is an undamped oscillatory. 
Proof: Using the analytic argument, the proof of these statements can be reconstructed. 
The technical details are omitted. 
Remark 4.4.4 From   ( ̅)    and      , we observe that the condition |  |    in 
Proposition 4.4.3 is equivalent to   ( ̅)   . 
Remark 4.4.5 The stability and instability conditions with respect to discrete time 
dynamic process described in Remark 4.3.2 can be formulated. In this case, the 
eigenvalues are modified to 
   
 
 
 √(
 
 
)
 
 (   )  ( ̅) and    
 
 
 √(
 
 
)
 
 (   )  ( ̅). 
A remark similar to Remark 4.4.4 is valid with regard to the process defined in Remark 
4.3.1. 
 
4.5 Speed of Adjustment 
The speed of adjustment,  , plays an important role in CAE and LAE processes. In 
(4.3.1) and (4.3.5), it is assumed to be      . In this section, however, we relax this 
condition by allowing   to be bigger than zero (   ).  
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4.5.1 Current Adaptive Expectation (CAE) 
Under the new range of  , the stability and instability conditions of CAE process in 
Proposition 4.4.2 are modified in the following results. We simply state the results 
without the proofs. The proofs can be constructed by imitating the proof of Proposition 
4.4.2. 
Proposition 4.5.1 Let  ̅ be an equilibrium state of (4.3.2) and  and  are defined in 
Proposition 4.4.2 
a) If |(   )    |   , then  ̅ is a GUAS equilibrium state, 
b) If ∫   ( ̅   (   ̅))  
 
 
  , then  ̅ is a GUS equilibrium state, 
c) If |(   )    |   , then  ̅ is an unstable equilibrium state. 
Likewise, the stability and instability conditions of Corollary 4.4.2 are modified and 
presented in the following corollary: 
Corollary 4.5.1 Let  ̅ be an equilibrium state of (4.3.2). 
a) If |(   )     ( ̅)|   , then  ̅ is a LUAS equilibrium state, 
b) If  |(   )     ( ̅)|   , then  ̅ is an unstable equilibrium state, 
where   is continuously differentiable at  ̅. 
In the following, we illustrate the significance of this corollary by providing the 
relationship between the speeds of adjustment ( ) and the speed of the market share 
adjustment process (  ( ̅)) in the context of stability and oscillatory properties of the 
market share adjustment process. 
Remark 4.5.1 The stability condition of  ̅  for CAE process in Corollary 4.5.1(a) is 
equivalent to the following condition: 
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   ( ̅)   . (4.5.1) 
Moreover, if (   )     ( ̅)   , then the solution process    oscillates with respect 
to the equilibrium state ( ̅). This condition is equivalent to 
  ( ̅)    
 
 
. (4.5.2) 
In particular,  
i. If   
 
 
   ( ̅)   , then  ̅ is non-oscillatory LUAS. See region (A) in Figure 
4.4a. 
ii. If   
 
 
   ( ̅)    
 
 
, then  ̅ is a damped oscillatory LUAS. See region (B) 
in Figure 4.4a. 
iii. If (   )     ( ̅)   , if and only if   ( ̅)    then    is an unbound non-
oscillatory solution. See region (C) in Figure 4.4a. 
iv. If (   )     ( ̅)    , if and only if   ( ̅)    
 
 
 then    is an undamped 
oscillatory solution. See region (D) in Figure 4.4a. 
Remark 4.5.2 The stability and instability conditions with respect to discrete time 
dynamic process described in Remark 4.3.1 in the context of arbitrary speed of 
adjustment process and Proposition 4.5.1 (a), (b) and (c) are described by |(   )  
 |   ,     and |(   )   |   , respectively. Moreover, the stability and 
instability conditions of Corollary 4.5.1 reduce to |(   )  ( ̅)   |    and |(  
 )  ( ̅)   |   , respectively. Moreover, in the light of Remark 4.5.1, the stability and 
oscillation conditions with regard to this case are as follows: 
a) We assume that      . Under this assumption, the stability conditions are 
reduced to the conditions in Remark 4.4.3.  
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b) We assume that    , we draw the following conclusions: 
i.   (   )  ( ̅)      if and only if     ( ̅)    
 
   
. Under this 
assumption,  ̅ is a non-oscillatory LUAS. See region (A) in Figure 4.4b. 
ii.    (   )  ( ̅)      if and only if   
 
   
   ( ̅)    
 
   
. 
Under this condition,  ̅  is a damped oscillatory LUAS. See region (B) in 
Figure 4.4b. 
iii. (   )  ( ̅)      if and only if   ( ̅)   . Under this assumption,  ̅ is 
unstable. See region (C) in Figure 4.4b. 
iv. (   )  ( ̅)       if and only if   ( ̅)    
 
   
. In this case,  ̅ is an 
undamped oscillatory. See region (D) in Figure 4.4b. 
  
(a) (b) 
 
Figure 4.4 Stability and oscillating regions of CAE process with regard to (a) Remark 
4.5.1 and (b) Remark 4.5.2 
 
4.5.2 Lagged Adaptive Expectation (LAE) 
From    
   
 
 √(
   
 
)
 
    ( ̅) and    
   
 
 √(
   
 
)
 
    ( ̅). Let    be the 
dominant root, and hence, 
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   {
   |  |  |  |
   |  |  |  |
  
Because of     and   ( ̅)   , we have         and  
   {
       
      
  
If |  |   ,  ̅ is a LUAS equilibrium state. This stability condition reduces to |   |  
     ( ̅)    (Kocic and Ladas, 1993). 
Remark 4.5.3 The stability condition of  ̅ for LAE process is equivalent to the following 
condition: 
  ( ̅)    and   ( ̅)  
 
 
  . (4.5.3) 
In addition, if        , then the solution process    oscillates with respect to the 
equilibrium state ( ̅). This condition is equivalent to 
   . (4.5.4) 
In particular, 
i. If       and   ( ̅)   , then  ̅ is a non-oscillatory LUAS. See region (A) in 
Figure 4.5c. 
ii. If       and   ( ̅)   , then    is an unbound and non-oscillatory solution. 
See region (C) in Figure 4.5c. 
iii. If     and   ( ̅)  
 
 
  , then  ̅ is a damped oscillatory LUAS. See region 
(B) in Figure 4.5c. 
iv. If     and   ( ̅)  
 
 
  , then    is an undamped oscillatory solution. See 
region (D) in Figure 4.5c. 
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(a) (b) (c) 
Figure 4.5 Stability and oscillating regions of (a) SE (b) CAE and (c) LAE process. 
 
Figure 4.5 exhibits the decomposition of the first quadrant into the subsets consisting of 
the ordered pair of parameters (    ( ̅))  that create the various characteristics of 
equilibrium states. The parametric subset (A) is a non-oscillatory LUAS region; the 
parametric subset (B) consists of a damped oscillatory LUAS region; the subset (C) 
characterizes the unstable region and subset (D) consists of the undamped oscillatory 
region. 
From (4.4.10), (4.5.1)-(4.5.4), the stability and oscillating conditions of SE, CAE and 
LAE processes are the same when      , and are different when    . See Figure 
4.6 and Table 4.2. 
 
 
Figure 4.6 Stability and oscillating regions of all processes 
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Table 4.2 Stability of equilibrium state and oscillatory of all processes 
 
Region 
SE CAE LAE 
Stability Oscillation Stability Oscillation Stability Oscillation 
E Yes No Yes No Yes No 
F Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 
G Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
H Yes No Yes No No Yes 
I Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
J Yes No No Yes No Yes 
K No No No No No No 
L No No No No No Yes 
 
In the following remark, we compare the expectation type in the context of stability and 
oscillatory properties. 
Remark 4.5.4 
i. In the case of SE, the parametric subset is composed two non-oscillatory regions, 
stable and unstable. Moreover, the stable region is the union of subsets 
          and  , while the unstable region is the union of subsets   and  , 
  
  {           }. 
ii. In the case of CAE, the stable region is the union of subsets         and  , 
while the unstable region is the union of subsets     and  ,   
  {         }. 
The effects of the CAE process reduce the stability region and increase the 
instability region. In addition, the stability region of CAE process decomposes 
into two types of regions, namely non-oscillatory and damped oscillatory. The 
CAE process has destroyed the stability region   of SE process, and it is replaced 
by the undamped oscillatory region. 
iii. In the case of LAE, the stable region is the union of subsets     and  , while the 
unstable region is the union of subsets         and  ,   
  {     }. The effects 
 73 
of LAE process have further diminished the stability region and increased the 
instability region of LAE process. 
In summary, the stability regions (SR), the instability regions (IR) and the oscillatory 
regions (OR) of SE, CAE and LAE processes are ordered as   (  )    (   )  
  (   ) ,   (   )    (   )    (  )  and   (   )    (   )    (  ) , 
respectively. 
 
4.6 Initial State 
In the previous sections, we discuss the stability of equilibrium states and found that the 
actual and expected network market share converge to the stable equilibrium state. 
However, in network goods, the multiple equilibriums are commonly assumed, so then 
the location of equilibrium is determined by the initial expected network market share of 
a consumer,   
 . Using the Illustration 4.2.1, there are three equilibrium states. Figure 4.7 
is the solution paths of SE and CAE processes for various initial states. 
  
(a) (b) 
 
Figure 4.7 Solution path for various initial points of SE (a) and CAE (b) when  (   )  
   
 
         
 ,          (   ), price = 2.5 and       
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For the SE process along with the CAE process, if the initial state,   [   ̅ ), then the 
solution paths will converge at  ̅ ; if the initial state,     ̅ , then the solution paths 
will be a fixed point  ̅ ; if the initial state,    ( ̅   ], then the solution paths will 
converge at  ̅ . Moreover, the adjustment process of the SE process is faster than the 
CAE process. In the case of the LAE process, we need a pair of initial states at a first and 
second period, (  
    
 ). Figure 4.8 is a phase diagram of LAE process for various initial 
states. The solution paths will converge at either the lower or upper stable equilibrium 
state, if any pairs of initial states start in area (1) and area (2), respectively. 
 
 
Figure 4.8 Phase diagram for various pairs of initial points of LAE process when 
 (   )  
   
 
         
 ,          (   ), price = 2.5 and       
 
 
4.7 Conclusions 
In the study of network goods, the market share has an influence on the utility. In this 
work, employing the idea of Katz and Shapiro (1985), we modify the utility function that 
depends on the value of network externality function at an expected market size/share at a 
real time,  . Therefore, consumers must speculate the market share through their 
expectations. In this chapter, we briefly review two well-known expectations, namely, 
rational and static. We introduced a well-known expectation, namely, adaptive 
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expectation with current information about the market share. We further extend this 
adaptive expectation by employing lagged information. By utilizing the modified utility 
function, the concept of market share adjustment function is introduced, and further 
dynamic models corresponding to consumer rational, static, and current and lagged 
adaptive expectation processes are developed in a systematic and unified way. By using 
mathematical tools, we establish the existence of equilibrium state and its independence 
of adaptive expectations. Furthermore, the qualitative properties of equilibrium states 
(stability, oscillatory) depend on the dynamic models and speed of adjustment parameter. 
The introduction of adaptive processes generates both damped and undamped 
oscillations. Moreover, for      , the stability results are independent of the types 
of expectation. However, when    , the stability and the oscillation properties depend 
on both the speed of adjustment ( )  and the speed of the market share adjustment 
process (  ( ̅)) at the equilibrium state  ̅. In fact, the positive quadrant described by 
(    ( ̅)) can be decomposed into mutually disjointed subsets. Moreover, this leads to 
the decomposition of the positive quadrant that is based on the properties of the 
equilibrium states of the market share adjustment process. These results provide tools for 
policy and decision making processes for network goods.  
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CHAPTER 5  
AGENT-BASED MODELING SIMULATION UNDER 
LOCAL NETWORK EXTERNALITY 
 
In general, consumer utility of network goods is affected by the entire network size. The 
socio-cultural-economic affinities of consumers influence the network externality 
processes. In this chapter, we treat a consumer decision as a consumer decision dynamic 
process. We then formulate a dynamic structural representation of a consumer network 
structure, structure of utility function and decision rule under the influence of local 
network externality concept. This formulation generates a mathematical model for a 
consumer decision dynamic process. The byproduct of the dynamic model leads to an 
agent-based simulation model. The simulation model is used to investigate different types 
of consumer decision dynamic market equilibriums. Moreover, prototype illustrations are 
given to exhibit the association between network attributes and its market equilibriums. 
 
5.1 Introduction 
There is a tremendous growth in the literature analyzing the area of network externality, 
for example, Economides and Salop (1992), Economides (1996), Farrell and Katz (2000), 
Farrell and Saloner (1985), Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1986). A common assumption in the 
study of network externality is that all consumers are equally likely to interact to each 
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other. Consequently, network externality depends on the network size irrespective of an 
eco-socio-cultural structure of consumer network community. In real situations, the 
network externality arises from the size of local neighborhood and certain attributes of 
consumers rather than the entire network. For example, cell phone networks and software 
packages have local network externality, because user’s utility depends on the number of 
his/her interacting friends (co-workers) under the usage of the same network (package) 
rather than on the entire market. 
Utilizing the concepts of consumer based value of network goods, externality function 
and prices of multiple network market goods, Katz and Shapiro (1985) initiated a static 
mathematical model of utility and formulated a decision rule under the homogeneous 
consumer decision process. In addition, this work deals with the rational equilibrium 
(under fulfilled expectation assumption) and the study of welfare at the equilibrium. 
Recently, partitioning the consumer community into interacting groups, Banerji and 
Dutta (2009) have generalized Katz and Shapiro (1985) model. Moreover, the work also 
deals with allocation conditions for the rational equilibrium and its byproduct to the 
market segmentation. Using the idea of local network externality, network structure and 
Hotelling line, Fjeldstad, Moen and Riis (2010) constructed a utility function, and studied 
the characterization of rational equilibrium under the parametric variation of the static 
dynamic of network consumers for two network firms. Employing a local network 
externality and a network structure in the context of graph theory (setting a customer as a 
vertex and an edge as interaction) and Pareto-rank based scalar neighborhood probability; 
Sundararajan (2007) has shown that the Bayes-Nash equilibria of the network game are 
monotone strategies. In addition, each Bayes-Nash equilibrium has a corresponding 
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fulfilled expectation equilibrium. Moreover, Dynamic Models of Adaptive Expectations 
for Network Goods (Paothong and Ladde, 2013) motivates to extend the characterization 
of rational equilibrium to adaptive type equilibria. 
Furthermore, from a recent study on two-scale network dynamic model of human 
mobility process (Wanduku and Ladde, 2011), we conclude that the eco-socio-cultural 
interactions generate inhomogeneity in the network goods consumer community, and the 
inhomogeneity generates a local network externality. The group dynamic interaction 
(Ladde and Ladde, 2012) and collective behavior of multi-agent network dynamic 
systems (Chandra and Ladde, 2010) signify the role and scope in the area of network 
goods in the 21st century. 
In this chapter, by introducing the idea of consumer decision dynamic process under the 
influence of socio-cultural economic affinities, a dynamic structural representation of 
consumer network structure, structure of utility function, local network externality 
function and consumer decision rule are formulated. This formulation generates a 
mathematical model for a consumer decision dynamic process. The byproduct of this 
model is the development of a consumer agent-based simulation model. The developed 
simulation model is used to characterize the network attributes with its market equilibria. 
The agent-based modeling simulation (ABMS) approach of Axelord (1997) is employed 
to determine the equilibrium under the local externality. We treat customers as agents in 
the model. They adapt their attributes at each period until steady states are achieved. 
Thus, the complex adaptive process is suitable for the simulation work. 
In Section 5.2, we developed a consumer decision model that is composed of network 
structure, structure of utility function and consumer decision rule. In Section 5.3, we 
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describe some characteristics of market equilibrium. This formulation would provide the 
structures and behavior rules of consumers for ABMS. In Section 5.4, a consumer agent-
based model is developed. The ABMS is employed to investigate the relationship 
between the network attributes and the characteristics of market equilibrium under the 
influence of local network externality in Sections 5.5 and 5.6. These results illustrate the 
effects of network attributes on the market equlibria. 
 
5.2 Development of Consumer Decision Model 
In this section, we treat the consumer decision to be a dynamic process. The decision 
forces are induced by a current consumer utility of network goods and relative 
magnitudes of affinities of consumer neighborhood structure. The influence of the 
consumer decision forces are measured by the market price, and the fraction of consumer 
network externality function coupled with inter-consumer socio-cultural-economic 
affinities. 
Under this consideration, the dynamic model of a consumer decision process under local 
network externality caused by socio-cultural-economic conditions is composed of three 
parts: network structure, structure of utility function and consumer decision rule. In the 
following, we develop the model components, and formulate a mathematical model of 
consumer decision dynamic process. 
5.2.1 Network Structure 
Under the influence of local network externality, consumer utility is affected by the 
consumption of his/her neighbor and his/her satisfaction of the network good. However, 
the definitions of “neighbor” and “satisfaction” rely on the network structure. We 
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consider two network structures, namely, socio-cultural-economic structure and 
technological structure. The socio-cultural-economic structure provides a basis to define 
“neighbor” while the technological structure induces to define “satisfaction” of the 
network good. 
5.2.1.1 Socio-cultural-economic Structure 
We extend the concept of socio-cultural-economic preference described in Fjeldstad, 
Moen and Riis (2010), Ladde and Ladde (2012) and Chandra and Ladde (2010). Let   be 
the number of consumers in the market and    [   ]    be the socio-cultural-
economic K-dimensional column vector of the ith consumer, where     represents the 
socio-cultural-economic preference measure (affinity) of the ith consumer for the mth 
socio-cultural-economic feature. Let    
    (     )  be the magnitude of the mth 
socio-cultural-economic affinity between the ith and jth consumer, where    is 
projection on the mth component subspace. Let    [   ]    in which       be the ith 
consumer radius characterizing the maximum influence of the mth component of socio-
cultural-economic affinity that he/she can be influenced by the jth consumer. Thus, the 
jth consumer will be the neighborhood of the ith consumer, if the magnitude of at least 
one component of       is less than or equal to    , that is, the neighborhood 
(Dugundji, 1967) of the ith consumer at the time   is  ( )  {      (   )[   
  
   ]        } where  (   )  {        }. This type of neighborhoods provides the 
basis for the idea of local externality for the network goods. 
5.2.1.2 Technological Structure 
We extend the concept of technological preference in Fjeldstad, Moen and Riis (2010). 
Let    [   ]    be the technological L-dimensional column vector of the ith consumer 
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where     represents the technological preference measure of the ith consumer for the nth 
technological component feature. We further assume that firm A and B offer comparable 
network goods located at points A,   [  ]    and B,   [  ]   , where    and    
represent the nth technological component feature of respective goods. Let   
  
      (   )|      |  be the technological distance between firm A and the ith 
consumer. This distance induces the technological influence for the network goods. 
Remark 5.2.1 We note that the socio-cultural-economic and technological vectors may 
be related in a similar of Fjeldstad, Moen and Riis (2010). For example, when choosing 
the software programming, professors in Statistics prefer SAS while professors in 
Economic prefer MATLAB. Thus, we can write the socio-cultural-economic vector as 
      (   )  where   is LxK transform matrix,   is Lx1 matrix that has 
multivariate uniform distribution on    and      . If     then   and   are 
independent, and if     they are perfectly correlated. 
Remark 5.2.2 When      ,    ,     and           (   ) , the above 
described model reduces to the Hotelling location line model. In other word, the 
Hotelling location line model is the special case of the above model. See Figure 5.1. 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Image of Hotelling location line model 
 
5.2.1.3 Neighborhood and Consumer Decompositions 
For each time  , we classify each consumer of the network as either a Type-A or Type-B 
consumer. We introduce Type-A and Type-B consumer functions that are defined by: 
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 ( )  {
                                                     
                                                     
 
and 
  
 ( )  {
                                                     
                                                     
 
(5.2.1) 
where    and    stand for consumer type functions. We observe that a neighborhood is 
decomposed into two types. Let   
 ( )  and   
 ( )  be the decomposed sub-
neighborhoods of the ith consumer neighborhood,  ( ), corresponding to the Type-A 
and Type-B goods at the time  . Thus, we have 
  
 ( )  {    ( )    
 ( )   } 
  
 ( )  {    ( )    
 ( )   }. 
(5.2.2) 
Remark 5.2.3 
1. Clearly   
 ( )      
 ( )  and ∑ {  
 ( )    
 ( )}      . Furthermore, 
{  
 ( )   
 ( )} is a partition of  ( ) and  ( )    
 ( )    
 ( ). Let  ( ) 
be a number of elements in the set. Thus, it is obvious that  (  ( ))  
 (  
 ( ))   (  
 ( )). 
2. Moreover, we can redefine Equation (5.2.1) as 
  
 ( )  {
           ⋃   
 ( )    
           ⋃   
 ( )    
 and   
 ( )  {
           ⋃   
 ( )    
           ⋃   
 ( )    
. (5.2.1*) 
5.2.2 Structure of Utility Function 
In this subsection, we provide the description of consumer utility under the influence of 
structure of local network externality and technological feature. By comparing the utility 
of two goods, each consumer chooses to consume either Type-A or Type-B good at a 
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time  . The structure of utility function is composed of four components, stand-alone 
value of good ( ), network externality due to his/her neighbors who have consumed the 
same good (  ), compatibility cost due to his/her neighbors who have consumed the 
different goods (  ), and price of good ( ). 
  ( )        ( )     ( )    (5.2.3) 
We remark that the stand-alone value and price of network goods are assumed to be 
constant. 
Remark 5.2.4 The negative sign ( ) of the price in equation (5.2.3) signifies that the 
utility function measures the consumer surplus of each consumer. 
5.2.2.1 Stand-Alone Value 
The stand-alone value is defined by the satisfaction of good regardless of the decision of 
his/her neighbor. In general, this value is not uniform among consumers. In fact, the 
satisfaction increases when the technological distance decreases. By using the idea of the 
transportation cost in Hotelling location model (Sanjo, 2007), we introduce the concept of 
the consumer stand-alone value as a function of his/her location. The stand-alone value of 
Type A and Type-B goods are defined by 
   {
  
     
         (   )|      |        
 ( )   
  
     
         (   )|      |        
 ( )   
. (5.2.4) 
Remark 5.2.5 The constant of proportionality   is a network attribute. It measures the 
weight of stand-alone value to the utility. We observed that “the higher value of  , the 
lower strength of network externality”. 
5.2.2.2 Network Externality 
The network externality is the benefit that a consumer gets from his/her neighbors who 
consume the same good. The consumer considers the ratio of his/her neighbor for both 
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types of consumers and determines his/her benefit. The network externality is an 
increasing function on the ratio of neighbors who consumed the same good. For this kind 
of benefit, we employ the generalized network externality function,  , (Paothong and 
Ladde, 2012), where   [   ]  [   ],      and          ( )           ( )   . 
See Figure 5.2a. However, the influence of the neighbor may decrease along the distance; 
hence we introduce a scale function,  (   ), that has a diminishing property in radius,  . 
The scale function has the following properties: 
  
  
  ,  (   )    and 
       (   )   . For detail, see Figure 5.2b. Therefore, at the time  , the network 
externality of the ith consumer is as: 
   ( )  
{
 
 
 
    
 ( )   (    
 ) (
 (  
 ( ))
 (  ( ))
)        
 ( )   
   
 ( )   (    
 ) (
 (  
 ( ))
 (  ( ))
)        
 ( )   
  (5.2.5) 
 
  
 
Figure 5.2 Graphs of (a) network externality and (b) scale function that meets all 
assumptions 
 
5.2.2.3 Compatibility Cost 
The compatibility cost is the cost that a consumer compensates for his/her neighbors who 
consume the different good. Similar to the network externality, we employ the 
generalized network externality and scale function to the compatibility cost. Hence, 
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   ( )  
{
 
 
 
    
 ( )   (    
 ) (
 (  
 ( ))
 (  ( ))
)        
 ( )   
   
 ( )   (    
 ) (
 (  
 ( ))
 (  ( ))
)        
 ( )   
  (5.2.6) 
Equation (5.2.4) shows that the stand-alone value depends on location regardless of 
neighborhood. But, the Equation (5.2.5) and (5.2.6) show that the network externality and 
compatibility cost depends on the size of neighborhood regardless of location. 
Inserting (5.2.4), (5.2.5) and (5.2.6) into (5.2.3), yields the utility of ith consumer at a 
time   as: 
  ( )  
{
 
 
 
   
 ( )         (   )|      |   (    
 ) (
 (  
 ( ))
 (  ( ))
)   (    
 ) (
 (  
 ( ))
 (  ( ))
)          
 ( )   
  
 ( )         (   )|      |   (    
 ) (
 (  
 ( ))
 (  ( ))
)   (    
 ) (
 (  
 ( ))
 (  ( ))
)           
 ( )   
. (5.2.7) 
Remark 5.2.6 For the Type-A consumer, the coefficients in utility function (5.2.7), 
        and  , control the significance of four components. For example,    is small 
for non-network goods. 
5.2.3 Consumer Decision Rule 
We are ready to state a decision rule. For each period of time, all consumers compare 
their utilities from both goods and update their consumption choices. The simple 
algorithm that determines the consumption for the succeeding time is as follow: 
  
 (   )  {
     
 ( )    
 ( )
     
 ( )    
 ( )
  
 ( )     
 ( )    
 ( )
. (5.2.8) 
Let    
  ( ) be the difference of consumer utilities of two goods at a time  ,    
  ( )  
  
 ( )    
 ( ) . We define an indicator function relative to a set   as,   ( )  
{
        
        
. Using this definition, equation (5.2.8) can be written as: 
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 (   )     (   
  ( ))    
 ( ) { } (   
  ( )), (5.2.9) 
This means that “The consumer will consume a good that generates the higher utility or 
will keep his/her current good if the utilities of the goods are the same.” This statement is 
called consumer decision rule and Equation (5.2.9) is referred as a consumer decision 
dynamic model under the influence of both network structure and consumer utility 
function through consumer decision rule. We remark that (5.2.9) is indirectly controlled 
by the network attributes and consumer expectation process. In Table 5.1, we have 
summarized all seven network attributes. 
Table 5.1 Network attributes of ABMS for two firms 
 
Network attributes Symbol Domain 
Consumer radius   [  ]        
  
Market size        
Initial market share   
 ( )          ( )   [   ] 
Price          
Strength of stand-alone value        
Strength of network externality          
Strength of compatibility cost          
 
Illustration 5.2.1 
 
Figure 5.3 Image of network attributes for Illustration 5.2.1 
 
We illustrate the above model by considering the simple case referred in Remark 5.2.2, 
     ,    ,     and           ( 
 
 
  
 
) . We consider that there are 10 
consumers. The solid and clear dots represent consumers who consume the Type-A and 
Type-B good, respectively. The set of numbers corresponding to the dots is an index set 
of consumer. See Figure 5.3. For the sake of simplicity, we assume          
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     and        . Furthermore, we specify the network externality and scale 
functions that meet all conditions, and they are 
 ( )    
 
  (
 
   
)
  
  
        
, (5.2.10) 
and 
 (   )  
 
   
 . (5.2.11) 
Let us consider the sixth consumer who consumes the Type-B good, and his/her location 
is     . This implies that   
 ( )    and   
    
     
 
 
. If      , he/she has only 
one neighbor who consumes the Type-A good,  (  
 ( ))    and  (  
 ( ))   . In 
this case, the utility of the Type-A and Type-B goods are   
 ( )  
 
 
 
 
  
 and   
 ( )  
 
 
 
 
  
, respectively. From this, we infer that the utility of the Type-A good is greater than 
from the Type-B good. This implies that he/she will change his/her consumption from 
Type-B to Type-A for the following time,   
 (   )   . For      , he/she has two 
neighbors and the utilities of Type-A and Type-B goods are the same. Thus, he/she will 
preserve his/her consumption of the Type-B good. For further details, see Table 5.2. 
Moreover, if we know the exact values of     and ten locations, then we can track all 
consumer attributes for all time. Without loss in generality and for the sake of simplicity, 
we used the uniform distribution as an illustration. 
Table 5.2 Decision of the sixth consumer for Illustration 5.2.1 
    
 ( )     (  
 ( ))  (  
 ( ))   
 ( )   
 ( )   
 (   ) 
0.1 0  
 
  1 0 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
  1 
0.2 0  
 
  1 1 
 
 
  
 
 
  0 
0.3 0  
 
  2 3 
 
 
 
  
   
  
 
 
 
  
   
  0 
0.5 0  
 
  5 4 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
  1 
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5.3 Characteristics of Market Equilibrium 
The market equilibrium in the context of simulation process occurs at an approximate 
steady state time,     . The feasibility of this is assured by the stability property of 
equilibrium states described in Paothong and Ladde (2013/2014). This means that all 
consumer attributes are unchanged. In this section, we discuss three following interesting 
characteristics of market equilibrium. 
5.3.1 Market Share of Type-A Good 
The market share of the Type-A good,       ( ) is the ratio of the number of consumers 
who consume the Type-A good to the number of all consumers at a time  , 
      ( )  
∑   
 ( )    
 
. (5.3.1) 
In particular, at the steady state time,       ( ) is reduced to       (  )  
∑   
 (  )    
 
 
and its range is,         (  )   . If       (  )   , then the firm A dominates 
the entire market and drives the firm B out of the market. In addition, the expected 
market share of the Type-A good at the initial time (   ) is  [      ( )]   . This is 
determined by the Bernoulli distribution of consumer type at the initial time, 
  
 ( )          ( ). 
5.3.2 Herfindahl–Hirschman Index 
In this subsection, we utilize the concept of the Herfindahl–Hirschman index,    ( ) 
(Hirschman, 1964) to measure the market concentration at a time  . It is determined by 
the sum of squares of the market shares of all firms in an industry. In the case of duopoly, 
   ( )  (      ( ))
 
 (      ( ))
 
  (      ( )   
 
)
 
  
 
. (5.3.2) 
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In particular, at the steady state time,    ( ) is reduced to    (  )   (      (  )  
 
 
)
 
  
 
 and its range is, 
 
 
    (  )   . If    (  )   , then either firm A or firm B 
dominates the entire market. If    (  )  
 
 
, then it implies that both firms split the 
share evenly. In addition, we compute the expectation of this index at the initial time 
(   ), and we have  [   ( )]          . 
5.3.3 Market Utility 
The market utility,   ( ), is the sum of utilities of all consumers at a time  , that is, 
  ( )  ∑   ( )
 
   . (5.3.3) 
From Remark 5.2.4, the market utility in (5.3.3) actually measures the consumer surplus. 
In addition, from (A.6) in the Appendix A, the expected market utility at the initial state 
(   ) is 
 [  ( )]  {
 (   ) 
 
      (   )   
 
  
(   )(        )
[  [      (   )]  (   ) [  (   )     ]]
. (5.3.4) 
Let us consider the case in which the market is dominated at the steady state. If firm A 
dominates market, then this is equivalent to    . Hence, Equation (5.3.4) becomes 
  (  )   (
 (   )
 
 
 
   
     ). Similarly, if firm B dominates market, then it is 
equivalent to     and hence   (  )   (
 (   )
 
 
 
   
     ). 
  (  )  {
 (
 (   )
 
 
 
   
     )                      
 (
 (   )
 
 
 
   
     )                      
. 
(5.3.5a) 
(5.3.5b) 
The Table 5.3 summarizes the above three characteristics of the market equilibrium at the 
initial and steady state time. 
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Table 5.3 Value of three characteristics at the initial time and dominant situation 
 
Market characteristics      
 ( )    ( )   ( ) 
Expected value at              
  (5.3.4) 
Firm A Dominates at          (5.3.5a) 
Firm B Dominates at          (5.3.5b) 
 
 
5.4 Agent-Based Modeling Simulation Model 
Agent-based modeling simulation is a recently introduced modeling approach to analyze 
enter-agent interactions. There are at least three advantages of the ABMS. First, its 
assumptions underlying the model are simple. Simplicity is also helpful for readers to 
understand and for researcher to extend the model. Second, the complex adaptive process 
belongs to the work of simulation. Thus, complex tools aren’t needed here. Third, 
because of ABMS, all network attributes are traceable from initial state to steady state. 
The ABMS is more feasible. It is based on certain assumptions and adaptable attributes 
of agents. Each agent’s decision relies on his/her environment and interactions with the 
others. One of the objectives of this chapter is “How do the network attributes influence 
the three characteristics of market equilibrium?” To investigate this question, we adjust 
the values of the seven fundamental network attributes (listed in Table 5.1) and compute 
the three characteristics for each simulation. To do so, we need the following 
assumptions: 
a) All consumers have an identical utility function 
b) All consumer locations and radii are fixed for any time,    . 
c) All consumers have perfect information about their neighbor’s attributes. 
d) All consumer behaviors are consistent. 
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e) The prices of goods are time invariant. 
Moreover, to determine the equilibrium by simulation, we need to specify the following: 
1. For simplicity in simulation, we assign      ,    ,     and 
          ( 
 
 
  
 
) 
2. The network externality function in (5.2.10) is utilized. 
3. The scale function in (5.2.11) is utilized. 
4. The initial value of the seven network attributes is controlled in an appropriate 
domain. For example,     and     represents two extreme cases, namely, 
non-network and global network externality goods, respectively. Therefore, an 
appropriate domain for radius is   [   ] . In fact,   is represented in a 
normalized form. Similarly,     and     represents a monopoly situation of 
firm B and A, respectively. Hence, the choice of domain for   is motivated by 
probabilistic character of initial market share,   [   ]. However, there is no 
upper limit for market size, price, strength of stand-alone value, strength of 
network externality and strength of compatibility cost. 
In the following, we exhibit each simulation step according to the objectives of our study: 
Step 1. Assign various initial values to the fundamental network attributes 
Step 2. Assign the values to all remaining parameters 
Step 3. Generate the all consumer locations,           ( 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
Step 4. Generate all consumer type at the initial time,   
 ( )          ( ) 
Step 5. Each consumer updates his/her type according to consumer decision dynamic 
model (5.2.9) that implies 
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 (   )  {
     
 ( )    
 ( )
     
 ( )    
 ( )
  
 ( )     
 ( )    
 ( )
 
Step 6. Repeat step 5 for all consumers 
Step 7. Repeat steps 5 to 6 until it attains a steady state 
Step 8. Calculate the three characteristics of market equilibrium,       (  ),    (  ) 
and   (  ) 
Step 9. Repeat steps 2 to 8 for 1000 times 
Step 10. Calculate the average of       (  ),    (  ) and   (  ) 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4 Flow chart of ABMS for two firms 
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5.5 Simulation Results 
In this section, we outline the effects of the seven network attributes on the three 
characteristics of market equilibrium under local network externality for a duopoly 
market. We conduct this study for each network attribute varying over domain and fixing 
remaining network attributes. We employ these settings into ABMS and plot the results 
in Figure 5.5-Figure 5.11. Each figure is composed of a solid line representing the 
expected value at the initial time, a dotted line showing the simulation results, and a 
dashed line exhibiting the market dominated value. 
5.5.1 Consumer Radius 
The consumer radius increases the ability to connect to the others. We investigate its 
influence by controlling its appropriate domain. In this case, we assign the values of the 
parameters                      and    and allow   to vary on [   ]. In short, we 
have the following: 
  [   ]                      
                         
 
According to this scenario, the Table 5.3 is reduced to Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4 Specific value of Table 5.3 for scenario 5.5.1 
 
Market characteristics       ( )    ( )   ( ) 
Expected value at               
Firm A Dominates at             
 
   
  
Firm B Dominates at             
 
   
  
 
Under this scenario, we plot the market share, HHI and market utility value as a function 
of consumer radius,   [   ]. 
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Figure 5.5 Simulated result showing influence of consumer radius on three 
characteristics 
 
Figure 5.5 (a), (b) and (c) illustrate the influence of consumer radius on the average of the 
three characteristics. At the initial time,  [   ( )]      and  [  ( )]   . From 
these simulation results at the steady state, we conclude that: 
i. the simulated market share curve is constant, and about 0.5 for all    ; 
ii. the simulated HHI curve is non-decreasing on [   ) into [     ], and as      , 
   (  )   ; 
iii. the simulated market utility curve monotonically converges to   (  )  
   
 
   
, for    . In fact, this leads to the monopoly situation. 
In other words, the increase in consumer radius causes to enhance the chance of 
monopoly, except       . 
5.5.2 Market Size 
Under the constant length of the Hotelling line, the market size increases the density of 
the consumer. Consequently, all consumers have more neighbors. We examine its 
influence by controlling its domain. In this case, we assign the values of the parameters 
                     and    and allow   to vary on   . In short, we have the 
following:  
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Based on this scenario, the Table 5.3 is reduced to Table 5.5. 
Table 5.5 Specific value of Table 5.3 for scenario 5.5.2 
 
Market characteristics       ( )    ( )   ( ) 
Expected value at               
Firm A Dominates at          
 
 
  
Firm B Dominates at          
 
 
  
 
Under this case, we plot the market share, HHI and market utility value as a function of 
the market size,     . 
   
 
Figure 5.6 Simulated result showing influence of market size on three characteristics 
 
Figure 5.6 (a), (b) and (c) illustrate the influence of market size on the average of three 
characteristics. At the initial time,  [   ( )]      and  [  ( )]   . From these 
simulation results at the steady state, we draw the following conclusions: 
i. the simulated market share curve is constant, and its value is about 0.5 for any 
    ; 
ii. the simulated HHI curve is constant, and its value is about 0.8 for any     ; 
iii. the simulated market utility curve has estimated slope (Least Square Method) 
0.1877, and hence deviates from the monopoly situation which has slope 0.2. 
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In the other words, the increase in market size does not affect the market concentration 
but increases the market utility. 
5.5.3 Initial Market Share 
The initial market share represents the market share of Type-A good at the initial time 
(   ). Now, we show its influence by controlling its appropriate domain. In this case, 
we assign the values of the parameters                      and    and allow   to 
vary on [   ]. In summary, we have the following: 
               [   ]          
                         
 
Using these parameter values, the Table 5.3 is reduced to Table 5.6. 
Table 5.6 Specific value of Table 5.3 for scenario 5.5.3 
 
Market characteristics       ( )    ( )   ( ) 
Expected value at                   
(    ) 
        
  
Firm A Dominates at             
Firm B Dominates at             
 
Under this case, we again plot the market share, HHI and market utility value as a 
function of the initial market share,   [   ].  
   
 
Figure 5.7 Simulated result showing influence of initial market share on three 
characteristics 
 
Figure 5.7 (a), (b) and (c) illustrate the influence of initial market share on the average of 
three characteristics. At the initial time from Table 5.3, we have  [   ( )]       
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    and  [  ( )]    
(    ) 
        
. From these simulation results at the steady state, we 
draw the following conclusions: 
i. the simulated market share curve increases and it is S-shaped between 0 to 1; 
ii. the simulated HHI curve is one when |     |      ; 
iii. the simulated market utility curve converges to the monopoly situation when 
|     |      ; 
iv. for            , the simulated curves (a), (b) and (c) signify that both firms 
A and B are operating with the increasing market share of firm A, the decreasing 
market share of firm B, and the market utility is less than the monopoly situation. 
In other words, (ii) and (iii) can be interpreted as “if the initial market share is too low 
(high), then the firm will completely lose (win) the market”. 
5.5.4 Price 
To consume either the Type-A or B good, all consumers consider price of both goods,    
and   . For the sake of simplicity for simulation, we assign     . Hence, the 
difference of price is the price of Type-A good itself, it is represented by          . 
We investigate its influence by controlling its domain. In this case, we assign the values 
of the parameters                     and    and allow     to vary on  . In short, 
we have the following: 
                             
                         
 
Using these values of parameters, the Table 5.3 is reduced to Table 5.7. 
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Table 5.7 Specific value of Table 5.3 for scenario 5.5.4 
 
Market characteristics       ( )    ( )   ( ) 
Expected value at                    
Firm A Dominates at                     
Firm B Dominates at             
 
Under this case, we again plot the market share, HHI and market utility value as a 
function of the price of Type-A good,      , where     is as define before. 
   
 
Figure 5.8 Simulated result showing influence of price on three characteristics 
 
Figure 5.8 (a), (b) and (c) illustrate the influence of price on the average of three 
characteristics. From these simulation results at the steady state, we draw the following 
conclusions: 
i. the simulated market share curve is negatively S-shaped (Paothong and Ladde, 
2012); 
ii. the simulated HHI curve is one when |   |      ; 
iii. the market utility converges to the monopoly situation when |   |      ; 
iv. for               , the simulated curves (a), (b) and (c) signify that both 
firms A and B are operating with the decreasing market share of firm A, the 
increasing market share of firm B, and the market utility is less than the monopoly 
situation. 
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In the other words, (ii) and (iii) signify the fact that “if the price is too low (high), then 
the firm will completely win (lose) the market”. 
5.5.5 Strength of Stand-Alone Value 
The strength of stand-alone value represents the significance of location in the Hotelling 
model. We examine its influence by controlling its appropriate domain. In this case, we 
assign the values of the parameters                      and    and allow   to vary 
on   . In short, we have the following: 
                             
                         
 
From these given values of the parameters, the Table 5.3 is reduced to Table 5.8. 
Table 5.8 Specific value of Table 5.3 for scenario 5.5.5 
 
Market characteristics       ( )    ( )   ( ) 
Expected value at                 
Firm A Dominates at                 
Firm B Dominates at                 
 
Under this case, we again plot the market share, HHI and market utility value as a 
function of the strength of stand-alone value,     . 
   
 
Figure 5.9 Simulated result showing influence of strength of stand-alone value on three 
characteristics 
 
Figure 5.9 (a), (b) and (c) illustrate the influence of strength of stand-alone value on the 
average of the three characteristics. At the initial time,  [   ( )]      and 
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 [  ( )]     . From these simulation results at the steady state, we conclude the 
following: 
i. the simulated market share curve is constant, and it is about 0.5 for all    ; 
ii. the simulated HHI curve is non-increasing and defined on    into [     ], and as 
      ,        , that is, the strength of stand-alone value diminishes the 
chance of monopoly; 
iii. the simulated market utility curve converges to        for all    . 
5.5.6 Strength of Network Externality 
We measure the strength of network externality through two constants,    and   . For 
the sake of simplicity, for simulation, and to compare the relative strength of two 
networks, we assign     . Hence, their relative strength is the strength of network A 
itself, it is denoted by      
  
  
. We investigate its influence by controlling its 
appropriate domain. In this case, we assign the values of the parameters 
                    and    and allow      to vary on   . In short, we have the 
following: 
                            
                            
 
Using these parametric values, the Table 5.3 is reduced to Table 5.9. 
Table 5.9 Specific value of Table 5.3 for scenario 5.5.6 
 
Market characteristics       ( )    ( )   ( ) 
Expected value at              (      ) 
Value if firm A Dominates at                 
Value if firm B Dominates at             
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Under this case, we again plot the market share, HHI and market utility value as a 
function of the strength of network externality,        , where      is as defined 
before. 
   
 
Figure 5.10 Simulated result showing influence of strength of network externality on 
three characteristics 
 
Figure 5.10 (a), (b) and (c) illustrate the influence of strength of network externality on 
the average of the three characteristics. From these simulation results at the steady state, 
we have the following concluding observations:  
i. the simulated market share curve diminishingly increases; 
ii. the simulated HHI curve decreases when        and increases when       ; 
iii. the simulated market utility curve approaches the monopoly situation of firm A 
when       . 
In the other words, firm B has more chance to dominate the market when      is small 
and firm A has more chance to dominate the market when      is large. 
5.5.7 Strength of Compatibility 
We measure the strength of compatibility through the constants,    and   . For the sake 
of ease in simulations and to compare the relative strength of compatibilities, we assign 
    . Hence, their relative strength is the strength of compatibility A itself, it is 
denoted by      
  
  
. We show its influence by controlling its appropriate domain. In 
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this case, we assign the values of the parameters                     and    and 
allow      to vary on   . In short, we have the following: 
                            
                            
 
Using these parametric values, the Table 5.3 is reduced to Table 5.10. 
Table 5.10 Specific value of Table 5.3 for scenario 5.5.7 
 
Market characteristics       ( )    ( )   ( ) 
Expected value at              (      ) 
Firm A Dominates at             
Firm B Dominates at             
 
Under this case, we again plot the market share, HHI and market utility value as a 
function of the strength of compatibility,        , where      is as defined before. 
   
 
Figure 5.11 Simulated result showing influence of strength of compatibility on three 
characteristics 
 
Figure 5.11 (a), (b) and (c) illustrate the influence of strength of compatibility on the 
average of the three characteristics. From these simulation results at the steady state, we 
have the following concluding observations: 
i. the simulated market share curve diminishingly decreases; 
ii. the simulated HHI decreases curve when        and increases when       ; 
iii. the simulated market utility curve approaches the dominant situation of firm B 
when       . 
 103 
In the other words, firm B has more chance to dominate the market when      is large 
and firm A has more chance to dominate the market when      is small. 
 
5.6 Market Share and Policies 
At the beginning, the market share of firm is influenced by the probability of a consumer 
type, that is  [      ( )]   . At equilibrium, the firm objective, in general, is to have 
a high market share. In this section, we demonstrate that firm policies are dependent on 
its initial market share. The large firm has a high initial market share ( [      ( )]  
     ) and the small firm has initial market share ( [      ( )]       ). The 
presented results provide a glimpse of parametric variations as control 
mechanisms/strategies for planning and policy. We simulate the market share at the 
steady state by varying two attributes at the same time, probability of consumer type and 
the other six attributes. 
5.6.1 Consumer Radius 
In this case, we assign the values of the parameters                    and    and 
allow   and   to vary. In short, we have the following: 
  [   ]   [   ]                
                         
 
Under this case, we present 3D plot of market share versus   and   in Figure 5.12a. It 
shows that the large (small) firm prefers larger (smaller) consumer radius.  
5.6.2 Market Size 
In this case, we assign the values of the parameters                    and    and 
and allow   and   to vary. In short, we have the following: 
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         [   ]               
                         
 
Under this case, we present 3D plot of market share versus   and   in Figure 5.12b. It 
shows that the market size has no influence on the market share. 
5.6.3 Price 
In this case, we assign the values of the parameters                   and    and 
allow   and    to vary. In short, we have the following: 
         [   ]                 
                         
 
Under this case, we present 3D plot of market share versus    and   in Figure 5.12c. It 
shows that both large and small firms need to decrease price in order to increase its 
market share. 
5.6.4 Strength of Stand-Alone Value 
In this case, we assign the values of the parameters                    and    and 
allow   and   to vary. In short, we have the following: 
               [   ]           
                         
 
Under this case, we present 3D plot of market share versus   and   in Figure 5.12d. It 
shows that the large (small) firm prefers the lower (higher) strength of stand-alone value. 
5.6.5 Strength of Network Externality 
In this case, we assign the values of the parameters                   and    and 
allow   and    to vary. In short, we have the following: 
               [   ]          
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Under this case, we present 3D plot of market share versus      and   in Figure 5.12e. It 
shows that both large and small firms need to increase their strength of network 
externality. 
5.6.6 Strength of Compatibility 
In this case, we assign the values of the parameters                   and    and 
allow   and    to vary. In short, we have the following: 
               [   ]          
                            
 
Under this case, we present 3D plot of market share versus      and   in Figure 5.12f. It 
shows that both large and small firms need to decrease their strength of network 
externality. 
   
   
 
Figure 5.12 Simulated result showing 3D plots of market share versus probability of 
consumer type and (a) consumer radius  , (b) market size  , (c) price    , (d) strength of 
stand-alone value  , (e) strength of network externality     , and (f) strength of 
compatibility cost     . 
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5.7 Conclusions 
The presented consumer decision dynamic model consists of the network structure, the 
structure of utility function, and the consumer decision rule. We developed the network 
structure, the structure of utility function, and state the consumer decision rule in the 
context of economic concepts. Using this model, we investigate the effects of the seven 
network attributes on the three characteristics of market equilibrium, the market share of 
Type-A good, the HHI and the market utility in network market under local network 
externality. The developed consumer decision dynamic model provides a natural tool to 
develop an Agent-Based Modeling Simulation. The Agent-Based Modeling Simulation 
approach was used to assess the specified objectives. The seven network attributes are 
described by: consumer radius ( ), market size ( ), initial market share ( ), price (  ), 
strength of stand-alone value ( ), strength of network externality (  ), and strength of 
compatibility cost (  ) . Based on our simulated study, we draw the following 
conclusions: 
1. As the consumer radius increases, the chance of monopoly increases. 
2. The market concentration is unaffected by the change of market size. 
3. The lower the initial market share, the higher the chance of a firm to lose the 
competition. 
4. The increase in price causes its market share to decrease to zero and hence causes 
the market concentration to increase to one. 
5. As the strength of the stand-alone value increases, the chance of monopoly 
decreases. 
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6. The increase in strength of network externality causes an increase in the chance of 
a firm to dominate the market. 
7. The increase in strength of compatibility causes an increase in the chance of a 
firm to dominate the market. 
Finally, the byproduct of our study in Section 5.6 generates some market strategies for 
large firms to monopolize the market and for small firms to survive (predator and prey 
relationship). This is summarized in the following table. 
Table 5.11 Strategies of large firm to monopolize and small firm to survive 
 
Firm 
Consumer 
Radius 
Price 
Strength of 
Stand-
Alone 
Value 
Strength of 
Network 
Externality 
Strength of 
Compatibility 
Large High Low Low High Low 
Small Low Low High High Low 
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CHAPTER 6  
MULTI-TYPE CONSUMER INTERACTIONS UNDER 
LOCAL NETWORK EXTERNALITY 
 
In this chapter, we study the consumer interactions under a local network externality 
process. For a network good, in general, the consumer utility is affected by the size of 
entire network. However, under local network externality concept, the consumer utility is 
affected by the size of local neighborhood instead of the entire market. We develop the 
network structure, utility function, consumer decision rule and multi-type consumer 
interactions. In addition, we employ an agent-based modeling simulation (ABMS) to 
obtain the market equilibrium. Moreover, the presented work addresses the policies of a 
firm and how to monopolize or survive in the market. 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In economics, a single firm domination of the market is called Monopoly. The firm has a 
huge benefit, such as a power to set up the price or a quantity of commodity to achieve 
the firm’s overall objective. There are various causes of monopoly, for examples, 
economy of scale (Nicholson and Snyder, 2012), large investment of capital, barrier to 
entry, network externality (Samuelson and Mark, 2012), etc. For network externality, the 
interactions between consumers create an additional benefit to a consumer group. It 
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affects their consumptions, that is, the consumer’s utility is affected by the size of 
network. Consequently, a leading firm has more chance to dominate the market by 
driving its small competitors out of the business. However, in the real world situation, we 
realize that small firms are able to survive in network market process. One of the reasons 
among the others is that the consumer’s utility is affected by a local network externality. 
Under this concept, consumer utility depends on the size of his/her neighbor, not the 
entire market. The objective of this paper is to address the policies of the firms to 
monopolize, or to survive in the network good market. 
Paothong (2013) and Paothong and Ladde (2013/2014) have developed and investigated 
the relationship between network attributes and characteristics of market equilibrium 
under the influence of local network externality of two competing firms (duopoly). They 
addressed how to drive its competitor out of the market. This paper extends their model 
from two firms (duopoly) to multi firms. The key contribution is the additional 
knowledge of relationship between network attributes and characteristics of market 
equilibrium under several numbers of competitors for a network good. 
The byproduct of this paper is the development of a consumer agent-based modeling 
simulation model. The developed simulation model is used to characterize the network 
attributes with its market equilibria. The agent-based modeling simulation (ABMS) 
approach of Axelord (1997) is extended to determine the equilibrium under the influence 
of local network externality. We treat customers as agents in the model. They adapt their 
attributes at each period until steady states are achieved. Thus, the complex adaptive 
process is suitable for the simulation work. See more about ABMS at Helbing and 
Balietti (2011). 
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In Section 6.2, we develop a consumer decision dynamic model that is composed of 
network structure, structure of utility function and consumer decision rule under the 
influence of local network externality. In Section 6.3, we describe two economic terms, 
market share and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), (Hirschman, 1964). In Section 6.4, 
we employ the agent-based modeling simulation (ABMS) to achieve the aim of this 
paper. Finally, the simulation results are presented in Section 6.5. 
 
6.2 Development of Consumer Decision Model 
The consumer decision model is composed of three parts, namely, network structure, 
structure of utility function and consumer decision rule (Paothong and Ladde, 
2013/2014). In this section, we treat the consumer decision to be a dynamic process. The 
decision forces are induced by a current consumer utility of network goods and relative 
magnitudes of affinities of consumer neighborhood structure. The influence of the 
consumer decision forces are measured by the market price, and the fraction of consumer 
network externality function coupled with inter-consumer socio-cultural-economic 
affinities. Under this consideration, the dynamic model of a consumer decision process 
under local network externality is composed of three parts: network structure, structure of 
utility function and consumer decision rule. In the following, we develop the model 
components for multi-firms and formulate a mathematical model of consumer decision 
dynamic process. 
6.2.1 Network Structure 
Under the influence of local network externality, consumer utility is affected by the 
consumption of his/her neighbor and his/her satisfaction of the network good. However, 
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the definitions of “neighbor” and “satisfaction” depend on the network structure. We 
consider two network structures, namely, socio-cultural-economic structure and 
technological structure. The socio-cultural-economic structure provides a basis to define 
“neighbor” while the technological structure induces to define “satisfaction” of the 
network good. 
6.2.1.1 Socio-cultural-economic Structure 
We extend the concept of socio-cultural-economic preference described by Fjeldstad, 
Moen and Riis (2010), Ladde and Ladde (2012) and Chandra and Ladde (2010). Let   be 
the number of consumers in the market and    [   ]    where    (   )  
{        }  and    (   )  be the socio-cultural-economic K-dimensional column 
vector of the ith consumer, where     represents the socio-cultural-economic preference 
measure (affinity) of the ith consumer for the ath socio-cultural-economic feature. Let 
    ‖     ‖  ∑ (       )
  
    be the the socio-cultural-economic affinity between 
the ith and jth consumer, where      (   ) . Let      be the ith consumer radius 
characterizing the maximum influence of the socio-cultural-economic affinity that he/she 
can be influenced by the jth consumer. Thus, the jth consumer will be in the 
neighborhood of the ith consumer, if the magnitude of     is less than or equal to   , that 
is, the neighborhood of the ith consumer at the time   is  ( )  {  [      ]        }. 
This type of neighborhoods provides the basis for the idea of local network externality. 
6.2.1.2 Technological Structure 
We extend the concept of technological preference in Fjeldstad, Moen and Riis (2010). 
Let    [   ]    be the technological L-dimensional column vector of the ith consumer, 
where    (   )  and     represents the technological preference measure of the ith 
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consumer for the bth technological component feature. Let  stand for number of firms 
which offer comparable a network good. All firms are denoted by            with 
their respective locations as           . We further assume that    [  
 ]    are the 
vertices of a regular convex M-polygon inscribed in unit circle, where   (   ) and 
  
  represents the bth technological component feature of good from the mth firm. Let 
  
  ‖    
 ‖  be the technological distance between the mth firm and the ith 
consumer. This distance induces the technological influence for the network goods. 
Remark 6.2.1 We note that the socio-cultural-economic and technological vectors can be 
related as in Fjeldstad, Moen and Riis (2010). For example, when choosing the software 
programming, professors in Statistics prefer SAS while professors in Economic prefer 
MATLAB. Thus, we can write the socio-cultural-economic vector as       
(   )  where   is     transform matrix,   is     matrix that has multivariate 
uniform distribution on    and      . If     then   and   are independent, and if 
    they are perfectly correlated. 
Remark 6.2.2 The Hotelling location line model is the special case of the above model. 
For illustration, see Figure 6.1, when      ,    ,      [
  
  
],    and    
is uniformly distributed in equilateral triangle inscribed in unit circle. 
6.2.1.3 Neighborhood and Consumer Decompositions 
For each time  , we classify a consumer into one of the M sub-groups. The type-  means 
that he/she consumes the m-th good,   , for   (   ). We introduce a type-  
consumer function, which represents type of the ith consumer at time  . For   (   ), 
and    (   ) 
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Figure 6.1 Image of location model of 3 firms, there are three competitive firms and 
three consumers in the market. The neighborhood of the first consumer is the second 
consumer, not the third one,  ( )  { }. 
 
  
 ( )  {
                                                 
                                                           
 (6.2.1) 
Moreover, his/her neighborhood is also classified into M types. Let  
 ( ) be the type-m 
neighborhoods of the ith consumer at a time  , and defined by; 
  
 ( )  {    ( )   
 ( )   } (6.2.2) 
Remark 6.2.3 
1. We note that a consumer consumes only single good. 
2. {  
 ( )   
 ( )     
 ( )} is a partition of  ( ), that is, for all ,  
 ( ) are 
mutually disjoint and   ( )  ⋃   
 ( )    . Hence, 
 (  ( ))  ∑  (  
 ( ))    . 
6.2.2 Structure of Utility Function 
In this subsection, we provide the description of consumer utility under the influence of 
structure of local network externality and technological feature. The structure of utility 
function is composed of three components: stand-alone value of good ( ) , network 
externality due to his/her neighbors who have consumed the same good (  ) and price 
of good ( ). 
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  ( )        ( )    (6.2.3) 
Remark 6.2.4 The negative sign ( ) of the price in Equation (6.2.3) signifies that the 
utility function measures the surplus of each consumer. 
6.2.2.1 The stand-alone value 
The stand-alone value is defined by the satisfaction of good regardless of the decision of 
his/her neighbor. In general, this value is not uniform among consumers. In fact, the 
satisfaction increases when the technological distance decreases. By using the idea of the 
transportation cost in Hotelling location model (Sanjo, 2007), we introduce the concept of 
the consumer stand-alone value as a function of his/her distances from the location of 
firms. Let   
  be the distance between the th firm and the  th consumer, we define the 
stand-alone value of the mth good,   , as 
    
   (  
  
 
∑   
  
   
)          (   ). (6.2.4) 
Remark 6.2.5 The constant of proportionality   is a network attribute. It measures the 
weight of stand-alone value to the utility. We observed that “the higher value of  , the 
lower strength of network externality”. 
6.2.2.2 The network externality 
The network externality is the additional benefit that a consumer gets from his/her 
neighbors who consume the same good. We further assume that the network externality is 
directly proportional to the size of his/her neighborhood of the same good. Hence, 
   
 ( )     (  
 ( ))       (   ),  (6.2.5) 
Remark 6.2.6 For    (   ), the constants of proportionality    are also network 
attributes. They represent the strength of network externality with respect to the type-m 
good. 
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Inserting (6.2.4) and (6.2.5) into (6.2.3), the utility of ith consumer of    at a time   is 
described by 
  
 ( )   (  
  
 
∑   
  
   
)     (  
 ( ))    . (6.2.6) 
Remark 6.2.7 For type-m consumer, the coefficients in utility function (6.2.7),      and 
 , control the significance of three components. If,     , then the mth good is non-
network good. 
6.2.3 Consumer Decision Rule 
We are ready to state a decision rule. For each time  , all consumers compare their 
utilities with respect to the network goods and update their consumptions. Let      
{   } be an indicator function where    . A simple algorithm that determines the 
consumption for the succeeding time is as follow: 
  
 (   )        
 ( )     [  
 ( )     
 ( )], or (6.2.7) 
  
 (   )   { }(  
 ( )     [  
 ( )     
 ( )]), for   (   )  (6.2.8) 
where  { } is an indicator function with   { }. This means that “The consumer will 
consume a good that generates the highest utility; or the consumer will keep his/her 
current good, if the utilities of the goods are the same.” This statement is called consumer 
decision rule. Equation (6.2.8) is referred as a consumer decision dynamic model under 
the influence of both network structure and consumer utility function through consumer 
decision rule. We remark that (6.2.8) is indirectly controlled by the network attributes and 
consumer expectation process. In Table 6.1, we have summarized all five network 
attributes. 
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Table 6.1 Network attributes of ABMS for M firms 
 
Network structure’s attributes Symbol Domain 
Consumer radius        
Initial market share   [  ( )   ]      [   ] 
Price           
Strength of stand-alone value        
Strength of network externality          
 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Image of network attributes for Illustration 6.2.1 
 
Illustration 6.2.1 
From Figure 6.2, it follows that there are 3 competing firms and 10 consumers. These 
consumers are located inside the equilateral triangle. The dot, square and star marks 
represent consumers who consume   ,    and   , respectively. For the sake of 
simplicity, we assume              and           . Let us consider 
the first consumer who consumes    and his location is    (   ). This implies that 
  
 ( )    and    
 
 
  for all firms. If       , he has only one neighbor who consumes 
  ,  (  
 ( ))    and  (  
 ( ))   (  
 ( ))   . In this case, his utility are   
 ( )  
  
 ( )   
 
  and   
 ( )   
 
   . From this, we infer that he/she gains the most utility 
from   . This implies that the consumer will change his consumption from    to    for 
the succeeding time,   
 (   )   . For further details, see Table 6.2. Moreover, if we 
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know the exact values of     and ten locations, then we can trace all consumer attributes 
for all time. 
Table 6.2 Decision of the first consumer for Illustration 6.2.1 
 
   goods     (  
 ( ))  (  
 ( ))  (  
 (   ))  
 (   )   
 (   )   
 (   ) goods 
 
 
  1 
 
 
  0 1 0 
 
 
  
 
 
    
 
 
  2 
 
 
  1 
 
 
  1 1 2 
 
 
    
 
 
    
 
 
    3 
 
 
  1 
 
 
  3 2 2 
 
 
    
 
 
    
 
 
    1 
  1 
 
 
  3 4 2 
 
 
    
 
 
    
 
 
    2 
 
 
6.3 Characteristics of Market Equilibrium 
The market equilibrium in the context of simulation process occurs at the steady state 
time,     . This means that all consumer attributes are unchanged. In this section, we 
discuss two following interesting characteristics of market equilibrium. 
6.3.1 Market Share of Good 
The market share of   ,       ( )  is the ratio of the number of consumers who 
consume    to the number of all consumers at a time  , 
      ( )  
∑   
 ( )    
 
. (6.3.1) 
In particular, at the steady state time,       ( ) is reduced to       (  )  
∑   
 (  )
 
   
 
 
with its range,         (  )   . If      
 (  )   , then the  
  dominates the 
entire market and drives the rest of the competitors out of the market. This is due to the 
fact that the probability of type-m consumer at the initial time is assumed to be  , 
  [  
 ( )   ]   . Consequently, the expected market share of    at the initial time 
(   ) is  [      ( )]   [
∑   
 ( )    
 
]   . 
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6.3.2 Herfindahl–Hirschman Index 
In this subsection, we utilize the concept of the Herfindahl–Hirschman index,    ( ) 
(Hirschman, 1964) to measure monopolization of the market. It is determined by the sum 
of squares of the market shares of all firms in an industry. In the case of M firms, 
   ( )  ∑ (      ( ))
  
   . (6.3.2) 
In particular, at the steady state time,    ( )  is reduced to 
   (  )  ∑ (     
 (  ))
  
    with its range,  
      (  )   . If    (  )   , 
there is only one firm dominates the entire market. If    (  )   
  , then this implies 
that all firms split the share equally. This is because of the fact that the probability of 
type-m consumer at the initial time is assumed to be  , and the other types are 
   
   
, 
  [  
 ( )   ]    and   [  
 ( )   ]  (   )  (   )  for     and     
 (   ). Consequently, the expectation of HHI at the initial time (   ),  [   ( )]  
 [∑ (      ( ))
  
   ]  (   )
  (        ). 
 
 
Figure 6.3 Expectation of HHI at the initial time for                  
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Table 6.3 The value of two characteristics at the initial time and dominant situation 
 
Market characteristics       ( )    ( ) 
Expected value at       (   )  (        )  
Dominant    at          
Dominant    for     at          
 
 
6.4 Agent-Based Modeling Simulation Model 
Each time  , all consumers decide to consume a good that provides the highest utility. 
From (6.2.8), the decision of a consumer is affected by the interactions of his/her 
neighbors. Consequently, a type of consumer has dynamic behavior. One of the 
objectives of this work is to investigate five network attributes influence on market share 
and HHI at market equilibrium. Thus, we need a tool that analyze a consumer interaction 
process and also provide a dynamic formulation to have equilibrium states. The dynamic 
modeling formulation naturally paves the way to apply the agent-based modeling 
simulation approach. In short, the agent-based modeling simulation is suitable to further 
analyze the formulated dynamic model. Each agent’s decision depends on his/her 
environment and interactions with the others. There are at least three advantages of the 
ABMS. First, its assumptions underlying the model are simple. Simplicity is also helpful 
for readers to understand and for researchers to extend the model. Secondly, the complex 
adaptive process leads to utilize the work of simulation (Paothong and Ladde 
,(2013/2014)). Thirdly, all network attributes under ABMS are traceable from an initial 
state to a steady state. To investigate the objective of this work, we adjust the values of 
fundamental network attributes (listed in Table 1) and compute        and HHI for 
each simulation. For this purpose, we need the following assumptions: 
a) All consumers have an identical utility function 
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b) All consumers behave identically. 
c) All consumers have perfect information about their neighbor’s attributes. 
d) All consumer locations are fixed and their radii are the same, for any time,    . 
e) The prices of goods are time invariant. 
Remark 6.4.1 To understand the effects of network attributers, the non-network 
attributes factors such as utility function and consumer behavior must be homogeneous 
for all consumers. Thus, the assumptions (a), (b) and (c) are essential. In general, the 
price, consumer location and their radii can be time varying. However, for the sake of 
simplicity, we assume them to be constant. 
In the following, we exhibit each simulation step according to the objectives of our study: 
Step 1. Assign various values to each fundamental network attributes (Table 6.1) 
Step 2. Assign the values to all remaining parameters 
Step 3. Generate the all consumer locations,            in a regular convex M polygon 
Step 4. Generate type for all consumers at the initial time 
  [  
 ( )   ]    and   [  
 ( )   ]  (   )  (   ) for     
Step 5. Each consumer updates his/her type according to behavior rule (6.2.8), imply 
  
 (   )   { }(  
 ( )     [  
 ( )     
 ( )])  
Step 6. Repeat step 5 for all consumers 
Step 7. Repeat steps 5 to 6 until it attains the steady state 
Step 8. Calculate two characteristics of market equilibrium,       (  ) and    (  ) 
Step 9. Repeat steps 2 to 8 for 100 times 
Step 10. Calculate the average of       (  ) and    (  ) 
Step 11. Repeat steps 1 to 10 with various                
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Figure 6.4 Flow chart of ABMS for M firms 
 
 
6.5 Simulation Results 
In this section, we outline the effects of five network attributes on market share and HHI 
at equilibrium under the influence of local network externality. We conduct this study for 
each network attribute varying over its domain and fixing remaining network attributes in 
Table 6.1. For each simulation, we assign the market size      , without loss in 
generality, we pick      and     , for     and      (   ). We employ this 
setting into ABMS and plot the results in Figures 6.5-6.9. 
6.5.1 Consumer Radius 
As the consumer radius increases, the ability to connect the other consumers increases. 
We investigate its influence by varying     . That is, we assign the values of the 
remaining parameters               and allow   to vary on   . In short, we have the 
following: 
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Under this scenario, we plot the market share of    and HHI as a function of consumer 
radius,     . 
  
(a) (b) 
 
Figure 6.5 Simulated result showing influence of consumer radius on two characteristics 
 
Figure 6.5a and Figure 6.5b illustrate the influence of consumer radius on the average of 
two characteristics. At the initial time,  [      ( )]   [   ( )]     . From these 
simulation results at the steady state, we conclude that: 
i. for the lower radius, the mean of market share of    is about       but its 
variance is increase as the radius increases; 
ii. the simulated HHI curve is non-decreasing and converging to dominant situation 
whenever the radius increases. 
In other words, the increase in consumer radius causes to enhance the chance of 
monopoly. Thus, a monopolizing policy is to increase the consumer interactions. 
Moreover, under the larger number of competitors, the larger radius is required to 
monopolize the market. 
6.5.2 Initial Market Share 
The initial market share represents the market share of    at the initial time (   ). 
Now, we show its influence by varying   [   ]. That is, we assign the values of the 
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remaining parameters               and allow   to vary on [   ]. In summary, we 
have the following: 
         [   ]               
 
Under this scenario, we plot the market share of    and HHI as a function of market 
size,   [   ]. 
  
(a) (b) 
 
Figure 6.6 Simulated result showing influence of initial market share of    on two 
characteristics  
 
Figure 6.6a and Figure 6.6b illustrate the influence of initial market share of    on the 
average of two characteristics. At the initial time,  [      ( )]    and  [   ( )]  
(   )  (        ). From the simulation results at the steady state, we conclude 
that: 
i. the simulated        curve is non-decreasing and converging to dominant 
situation whenever the initial market share of    is increasing; 
ii. the simulated HHI curve converges to dominant situation as the initial market 
share of    increases. 
Thus, if    needs to monopolize the market, then it must have a comparative high 
market share at the beginning. Moreover, under the larger number of competitors, the 
smaller initial market share is required to monopolize the market.  
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6.5.3 Price 
To subscribe a good, all consumers consider price of all goods. We vary the price of    
and investigate its influence by varying      . Let        ̅ , where  ̅  is the 
average price of the remaining goods. Thus, if      (    ) means that the price of 
   is higher (lower) than the average price  ̅ . That is, we assign the values of the 
remaining parameters              and allow    to vary on  . In short, we have the 
following: 
                           
 
Under this scenario, we plot the market share of    and HHI as a function of market 
size,     . 
  
(a) (b) 
 
Figure 6.7 Simulated result showing influence of price on two characteristics 
 
Figure 6.7a and Figure 6.7b illustrate the influence of price of    on the average of two 
characteristics. At the initial time,  [      ( )]   [   ( )]     . From these 
simulation results at the steady state, we conclude the following. 
i. If     , the market share of    will increase, and    will drive the rest of the 
competitors out of the market. Consequently,    will monopolize the market. 
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ii. If     , the market share of    will decrease, and    will be out of the 
market. Consequently, all firms excluding    will split the market equally; see 
Figure 6.7b. 
This result proves that if a firm wants to dominate the market, then it must set the 
comparative low price at the early stage. Moreover, under the lager number of 
competitors, consumer is more sensitive to the price. That is, a firm has to set the very 
low price for the low competition. 
6.5.4 Strength of Stand-Alone Value 
The strength of stand-alone value represents the significance of location in model. We 
examine its influence by varying     . That is, we assign the values of the remaining 
parameters               and allow   to vary on   . In short, we have the following: 
                            
 
Under this scenario, we plot the market share of    and HHI as a function of the strength 
of stand-alone value,     . 
  
(a) (b) 
 
Figure 6.8 Simulated result showing influence of strength of stand-alone value on two 
characteristics 
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Figure 6.8a and Figure 6.8b illustrate the influence of strength of stand-alone value on the 
average of two characteristics. At the initial time,  [      ( )]   [   ( )]     . 
From these simulation results at the steady state, we have the following conclusions. 
i. The simulated        curve is constant and it is approximately about   . 
ii. The simulated HHI curve converges to    as the strength of stand-alone value 
increases. 
From (6.2.6), the higher value of   shows that the location is more significant than 
network externality, which is non-network good case. Consequently, all firms will split 
the market equally. If a firm needs to monopolize the market, then policy maker should 
make   as low as possible. 
6.5.5 Strength of Network Externality 
We measure the strength of network externality through constants,   . We vary the 
strength of network externality of    and investigate its influence by varying      . 
That is, we assign the values of the parameters              and allow    to vary on 
  . In short, we have the following: 
                            
 
Under this scenario, we plot the market share of    and HHI as a function of the strength 
of network externality,      . 
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(a) (b) 
 
Figure 6.9 Simulated result showing influence of strength of network externality on two 
characteristics 
 
Figure 6.9a and Figure 6.9b illustrate the influence of strength of network externality on 
the average of two characteristics. At the initial time,  [      ( )]   [   ( )]  
   . From these simulation results at the steady state, we have the following. 
i. The simulated        curve is non-decreasing and converging to dominant 
situation whenever the strength of network externality is increasing. 
ii. The simulated HHI curve converges to dominant situation as the strength of 
network externality increases. 
From (6.2.6), for higher value of   , the influence of    is more significant than the 
other firms. If    is higher than the others, then this leads to monopoly of    in the 
market. Moreover, under the lager number of competitors, the higher value of   is 
required to monopolize the market. 
 
6.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter, we studied the dominance of the network good under the influence of 
local network externality. Due to the local network externality concept, the consumer’s 
utility is affected by the size of local neighborhood instead of the entire market. We 
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develop the network structure, utility function and consumer decision rule under the local 
network externality in the context of economic concepts. In addition, we introduce an 
agent-based modeling simulation (ABMS) as a main tool of this analysis. Using this 
model, we investigate the effects of five network attributes on two characteristics of 
market equilibrium, market share of    and HHI for various number of firms (  
             ). Five network attributes are represented by: consumer radius ( ), initial 
market share of   ( ), price of   (  ), strength of stand alone value ( ) and strength 
of network externality of    (  ) . Based on our simulation study, we draw the 
following conclusions: 
1. As the consumer radius increases, the chance of monopoly increases. Moreover, 
under the larger number of competitors, the larger radius is required to 
monopolize the market. 
2. The higher the initial market share, the higher the chance of a firm to monopolize 
the market. Moreover, under the larger number of competitors, the larger initial 
market share is required to monopolize the market. 
3. The increase in price causes to decrease its market share to zero. Moreover, under 
the larger number of competitors, the firm that has high price is driven out faster. 
4. As the strength of stand-alone value increases, the chance of monopoly decreases. 
5. The increase of strength of network externality influences to increases the chance 
of firm to dominate the market. Moreover, under the larger number of 
competitors, the higher strength of network externality is required to monopolize 
the market. 
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Finally, the byproduct of our study in Section 6.5 generates some market strategies for 
leading firms to monopolize the market and for small firms to survive (predator and prey 
relationship). Moreover, this result extends the conclusion of Paothong (2013), that is, 
this work shows not only the policy of leading and small firms but also the policy of high 
and low competition. The conclusion is summarized in the following table. 
Finally, the byproduct of our study in Section 6.5 generates some market strategies for 
leading firms to monopolize the market and for small firms to survive (predator and prey 
relationship). This result extends the conclusion of Paothong (2013), that is, this work 
provides policy for the largest and smallest firm. Moreover, it also provides a policy for 
small and large number of competitors. The conclusion is summarized in the following 
table. 
Table 6.4 Strategies of firm to monopolize and survive in the market 
 
Size of Firm Largest Smallest 
Number of Competitors Small Large Small Large 
Consumer Radius High Very high Very low Low 
Price Very low Low Very low Low 
Strength of Stand Alone Value Low Low High High 
Strength of Network Externality High Very high Very low Low 
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CHAPTER 7  
FUTURE RESEARCH PLAN 
 
7.1 GNEF under Intervention Process 
In Chapter 2, the sign of  , we have either network externality function increasing 
(   )  or decreasing (   ) . However, this phenomenon can be interrupted by 
incorporating the discrete time intervention process (Ladde (2005), Ladde et al (2012)). 
In the modeling of network externality process, this intervention idea is indeed motivated 
by the overall policy of network/users or provider. In fact, the idea of intervention 
maintains competitive/cooperative behavior of the comparable network goods. This 
indeed avoids monopoly of a market of network goods. 
 
7.2 Further Extension of ABMS of Two Firms 
In future work, we plan to relax some of the assumptions and develop more complex 
network model. For example, we plan to investigate a complex network such as adaptable 
consumers’ and firms’ location, heterogeneous radius, non-uniform distribution for 
consumer location, non-Bernoulli distribution for consumer types, etc. 
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7.3 Further Extension of ABMS of Multi Firms 
In the future work, we plan to relax some of the assumptions and develop more complex 
network model. For example, we plan to investigate a complex network such as adaptable 
location, heterogeneous radius, non-uniform distribution for consumer location, etc. 
In Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, we plan to relax some of the assumptions and develop more 
complex network model. For example,  
 Non-uniform distribution for consumer location,            
 Non Bernoulli distribution for consumer types,   
 ( )           ( ) 
 The locations of firms are not at the vertices of regular convex M polygon. 
 The consumer radius is heterogeneous and adaptable. 
 The price of goods is heterogeneous and adaptable. 
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APPENDIX A 
Expected Values of Characteristics of Market Equilibrium 
 
In Chapter 5, employing the ABMS for two firms, we generate the locations of all 
consumers by uniform distribution,           (   ). Moreover, we also generate their 
types by Bernoulli distribution,   
 ( )          ( )  where     [  
 ( )   ] . 
Based on the simulation, we can determine the expectation of all variables at the initial 
state. 
A.1. Stand-Alone Value 
From (5.2.4), the expected value of the stand-alone value at the initial state is 
 [  ]   [  
 ]   [  
 ]  
 
 
(   ). (A.1) 
A.2. Market Share 
From (5.3.1), the expected value of the market share of the Type-A good at the initial 
state is determined by 
 [      ( )]  
∑  [  
 ( )]    
 
  . (A.2) 
A.3. Market Utility 
From (5.3.3), we compute the expected market utility at the initial time by the summation 
of the expected values of utility of all consumers,  [  ( )]  ∑  [  ( )]
 
      
 [  ( )]. Using (5.2.7), the expected utility for each consumer at the initial tine is 
determined by 
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 [  ( )]  
{
 
 
 
  (   [  ])   (    
 ) ( 
 (  
 ( ))
 (  ( ))
)   (    
 ) ( 
 (  
 ( ))
 (  ( ))
)           
 ( )   
 ( [  ]   )   (    
 ) ( 
 (  
 ( ))
 (  ( ))
)   (    
 ) ( 
 (  
 ( ))
 (  ( ))
)           
 ( )   
. (A.3) 
From (A.3), we obtain 
 [  ( )]  {
 [  
 ( )]  
 
 
(   )   (    
 ) ( )   (    
 ) (   )           
 ( )   
 [  
 ( )]  
 
 
(   )   (    
 ) (   )   (    
 ) ( )           
 ( )   
. (A.4) 
For simplicity, we assume     . Thus, the expected value of the market utility at the 
initial time is  [  ( )]   [   [  
 ( )]  (   )   [  
 ( )]], that is, 
 [  ( )]  {
 (   ) 
 
      (   )   
  ( )[ (    )   (    )(   )]   (   )[ (    )(   )   (    ) ]
. (A.5) 
Using simulation technique, we find the explicit form of   in (5.2.10) and   in (5.2.11). 
This together with (A.5), we have 
 [  ( )]  {
 (   ) 
 
      (   )   
 
  
(   )(        )
[  [      (   )]  (   ) [  (   )     ]]
. (A.6) 
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APPENDIX B 
Generating Random Points inside Convex M-Polygon 
 
We introduce a method to generate random points uniformly distributed inside the   
sided convex polygon ( -gon). We consider a convex  -gon (polygon with   sides) in 
two dimensional Euclidean space. For simplicity, it will be denoted clockwise by   
vertices,           . Thus, the sides of  -gon are represented by vectors            
in which 
          . (B.1) 
Because there are   sides, thus the index     is referred to  . For example,    
        is referred as         . Let  ̅ be a point inside convex  -gon in which 
 ̅     ∑   
 
   , and    be a vector that connects  ̅ and   , that is 
       ̅. (B.2) 
Then, the convex  -gon is partitioned into   triangles by           . We name these 
triangles by              . Each triangle is composed of three vectors, that is     is 
composed of       and     . See Figure B.1. 
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Figure B.1. Illustration of notation for convex  -gon 
 
Let    and   be the area and semi perimeter of    , respectively. By Heron’s formula 
(Weisstein, E. W. (n.d.)), we can calculate its area by 
{
       (‖  ‖  ‖  ‖  ‖    ‖)
   √  (   ‖  ‖)(   ‖  ‖)(   ‖    ‖)
. (B.3) 
The Simulation Steps 
1. Calculate a point inside the convex  -gon,  ̅ 
2. Partition the  -gon into   triangles,          
3. Calculate the area of each triangle 
4. Randomly choose a triangle. The probability of choosing a triangle is defined by its 
weighted area, that is,   (             )    (∑   
 
   )
  , where    as defined 
before. Let           (  ∑   
 
   ) 
If        , then choose     
If            , then choose     
If ∑   
 
       ∑   
   
   , then choose      , for    (     ) 
If ∑   
   
       ∑   
 
   , then choose     
5. Generating uniform random points in the chosen triangle 
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We employ Weisstein’s methodology (Weisstein, E. W. (n.d.)) to generate random points 
that are uniformly distributed in the chosen triangle. Let              (   ). Hence 
    ̅              is a random point that uniformly distributed in the ith 
quadrilateral. If    is distributed inside triangle, then return to      , otherwise return 
to              . Hence    is a random point that uniformly distributed in the 
chosen triangle,    . See Figure B.2. 
 
 
Figure B.2. Illustration of Weisstein’s methodology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
